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Commonalities and Prescriptions in the
Vertical Dimension of Global Corporate Governance
by
Lawrence A. Cunningham1
Discussions of comparative corporate governance have renewed the old question of
corporate social responsibility,  for whose benefit is the corporation to be operated? 2 It is customary
to think that US and UK law require that corporations be operated primarily for the benefit of
shareholders.  It is equally customary to think that German and other continental European law
require that corporations be operated for the common good–shareholders, workers, creditors,
communities and so on.  At a general and abstract level both these customary ways of thinking are
correct.
But the truth of these general statements does not altogether hold up at the level of particular
application.   The variety of practices within particular countries and across national borders and the
range of interests implicated and protected in different ways in both contexts render it difficult to
describe national models except at a fairly high level of generality.  Generalized descriptions can of
course be very useful, but it is also useful when it is possible to conceive of mechanisms that enable
more specific comparisons that transcend borders, whether international or intra-national.  To do so
requires a framework to distinguish types of governance mechanisms corporations use.
Corporate governance mechanisms can be divided into three categories, two internal and one
external.  Internal governance mechanisms that address the relationship between those in control of
the corporation on the one hand and all other constituents on the other (including shareholders,
workers, lenders and communities) can be called vertical.  Internal governance mechanisms that
regulate directly the relationship between these various constituencies inter se can be called
horizontal. External governance mechanisms are those rules and regulations imposed upon the
corporate entity to address concerns beyond the penumbra of interests the corporation impacts
directly, and include rules about competition and antitrust, national trade and security and so on.  
External and horizontal governance mechanisms tend to pose the most striking and specific
3  For an extensive list of scholarship devoted to comparative corporate governance, see
Edward B. Rock, America’s Shifting Fascination with Comparative Corporate Governance, 74
Wash. U. L.Q. 367, 367 (1996).
-2-
distinguishing features of comparative corporate governance, while vertical governance mechanisms
tend to be more universal and general. All these mechanisms are undergoing change and
convergence around the world.  Yet sufficient differences remain to enable presentation of
generalized pictures of comparative corporate governance.  This piece starts off with such pictures,
describing in Part I a typical way of thinking about comparative corporate governance.  It is a
statement of the main characteristics of dominant  models of corporate governance and finance: the
market model (chiefly US and UK), the European bank model (chiefly Germany and France), and
(more briefly) the Japanese bank model.
These characteristics are increasingly blurring, however, and many differences have been
overdrawn, as the descriptive and theoretical evidence presented in Part II suggests.  Governance
mechanisms from these models are converging or have been overlapping and  market, structural and
regulatory forces have contributed to these phenomena.  A key insight is that problems of vertical
corporate governance–the relation between those in control and others–and the mechanisms to
address them transcend much of the underlying differences posed or created by the differing external
and horizontal mechanisms of corporate governance. 
That insight suggests that there is reason to worry around the world as much or more about
vertical corporate governance mechanisms than external or horizontal ones.  Accordingly, Part III
moves to a prescriptive identification and evaluation of key vertical governance issues of importance
across borders.  These include some of the central topics of corporate governance generally and ones
most likely to pose increasing difficulties as globalization proceeds (executive selection and
compensation; acquisition policies; and capital allocation and dividend policy) with an emphasis on
the role boards of directors must and can play in addressing them.  Among the chief mechanisms
available to enhance such board action are rules governing or affecting director liability, constituency
voice and unimpaired markets.  The thesis, in short, is that signposts on the road to global corporate
governance must mark such vertical governance issues and the pavement must be laid with such
sensible vertical mechanisms to address the common problems facing corporate constituencies
worldwide.
I.  Comparative Corporate Governance
The phrase comparative corporate governance has been used to describe the study and
evaluation of differences in how and why countries allocate power among participants in the
corporation as well as the roles of financial institutions, institutional investors, and markets in
monitoring and constraining managerial discretion.3  It considers a range of national differences in
law and practice on such matters as to whom managers are responsible,  the role of labor and lenders
in the corporate governance system, and the effect of different qualities of capital markets in
corporate control and performance.
4  Much of the literature on comparative business law deals with particular countries or
particular issues.  For extensive collections, see The Sloan Project on Corporate Governance at
Columbia Law School, Corporate Governance Today 629-738 (1998) and Frank Woolridge,
Company Law in the United Kingdom and the European Community: Its Harmonization and
Unification (1991).
5  Another principal distinction could be that between advanced or developed economies
and emerging or undeveloped economies.  See Bernard S. Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-
Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 911 (1996).  This article deals directly
only with the former, but its insights should apply with some force to the latter as well.  See
Masahiko Aoki & Hyng-Ki Kim, Corporate Governance in Transitional Economies: Insider
Control and the Role of Banks (1995).
6  This foundational insight is always credited to Adolf Berle & Gardiner Means, The
Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932).
7  This description is always credited to Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structures, 3 J. Fin.
Econ. 305 (1976).
8  This conception of the shareholder’s position and choices is always credited to Albert
O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty (1970).
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It is common in describing the results of studying comparative corporate governance to offer
a somewhat stylized and simplified story of the dominant models, along substantially the following
lines, that tends to emphasize at an abstract level the major differences.4   Principal general
differences between the models can be thought of as lying upon two axes: constituency
characterization (mainly shareholders versus all stakeholders) and finance characteristics (mainly
disaggregated versus concentrated investment).5 
A.  The Shareholder Market Model
There are two central groups of participants in the conception and regulation of the US and
UK corporation, managers and shareholders.  Shareholders are the owners of the corporation’s
equity, whose value rises and falls with the fortunes of the corporation.  Managers are both the day-
to-day operators of the corporation (the officers) and those who oversee and supervise those
operations (the directors).  The key problem in US and UK corporate governance and perhaps the
key starting point of the subject is the resulting separation of ownership from control.6  Sometimes
described as the problem of agency costs,7 it is addressed through two broad sets of mechanisms,
monitoring and exit.8
Monitoring mechanisms include principally the imposition of the duties of care and loyalty
on managers for the benefit of stockholders.  They also include such mechanisms as annual
9  These sorts of checks on managerial power were captured as the anti-managerialist
stance in Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications
(1975).
10  See infra text accompanying notes [Part III.A].
11  See Charles M. Yablon, On the Contribution of Baseball to American Legal Theory,
104 Yale L.J. 227 (1994).
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shareholder elections of directors, powers to remove and replace directors, shareholder rights of
action, and other governance devices.9  Exit mechanisms include principally the free transferability
of ownership interests that enable shareholders to sell their stock and thus exit the corporation at
will, often called the Wall Street Rule. 
These two kinds of mechanisms are reinforced through market mechanisms that facilitate
them and their disciplining effect on attenuating the separation of ownership from control.  A market
for corporate control enables disgruntled shareholders to use monitoring mechanisms such as proxy
voting contests and consent solicitations to oust inferior managements.  The free transferability of
ownership interests has contributed to the development of deep, liquid and functionally efficient
capital markets through which stock can also be traded for the purpose of effecting changes in
control of a corporation. These market forces are made possible due in large part to the system of
disclosure required under both state and federal law in the US that promotes transparency of
performance.
That same transparency, coupled with the common law tradition of at-will employment, also
facilitates reasonably  functioning labor markets.  For managers, poor performance can lead not only
to ouster from current positions but also can make it difficult for them to find employment from
other employers afterwards.   These markets are far from perfect, however, and it is not uncommon
to see senior executives earn staggering compensation despite mediocre performance or worse.10
At the same time, managers generally have a fair amount of flexibility in contracting and
expanding their employee base as necessary to enhance performance.  To be sure, labor unions often
gain substantial power through collective bargaining agreements that are protected through contract
law and Federal labor laws, but that power remains a product of voluntary contracting rather than
externally imposed regulation.  Like it or not, finally, a consumer culture also contributes to
reasonably functioning product markets through which preferences are registered and performance
further disciplined.
Reinforcing these monitoring mechanisms in the US is the great-American past time,
litigation.11 Shareholders are equipped with a vast arsenal of legal claims, procedural devices, and
legal and equitable remedies to protect their interests.  They benefit from an entire sub-profession
of lawyers who specialize not only in bringing direct, derivative and class actions under state and
federal law, but also in identifying and communicating to management the bases for such actions and
12  See Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the
Prince of Denmark?, UCLA L. Rev. (1989).
13  In the “vicinity of insolvency,” director duties may alter to elevate creditor interests
above equity interests.  See Credit Lyonnais Nederland, N.V. v. MGM Pathe Communications
Co., 1991 WL 277613, 42 n.55 (Del. Ch. 1991).
14  E.g., Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. Rev. 283
(1998).
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often financing them.12
The rights of other participants in the corporation in the US and UK model differ from those
of shareholders.  The rights of employees, suppliers, creditors, customers and others are set by
contract.  One rationale for this treatment takes note that upon bankruptcy or liquidation of the
corporation the shareholders are residual claimants on the corporation’s assets–their claims are paid
only after the claims of these and other groups are paid.  By directing management to act in the best
interests of these residual claimants as owners, the interests of these prior claimants are protected
indirectly. Hence there is no need, for example, for corporate managers to owe fiduciary duties or
other non-contractual duties to lenders, although in that formulation the tension between the interests
of lenders and equity holders is defined.13
In this model, corporate governance can therefore be used as a way to describe the study of
the relationships among all the participants in the corporation.  The tendency given the special status
of shareholders in the US and UK is to concentrate on the relationship between managers and
shareholders, including all the rules governing director action such as voting, meetings, attention,
conflicts and so on, as mechanisms to attenuate the significance of the separation of ownership from
control.  While reform-minded proponents regularly urge greater rights for other participants in the
firm, particularly labor,14 and their role is of course very important, the rights of these other
participants tend to be addressed by other substantive bodies of law, most notably contracts but also
labor law, commercial law, debtor-creditor law, consumer protection law and corporate finance.
Putting shareholders first in corporate governance by these devices leads to the description
of this model as the shareholder market model.  The central finance characteristic of this model is
fragmented ownership of equity securities in corporations.  An underlying cultural generator of this
ownership structure is said be an entrepreneurial spirit that encourages widespread participation in
equity investment, both in terms of those who demand it (start ups or expanding enterprises) and
those who supply it (venture capitalists and investors generally).    This structure to some extent also
rests upon a cultural aversion to concentrations of power.  The legal and political roots of the US
model lay in a preference for diffusion of power.  This landscape was drawn primarily through the
Glass-Steagall Act which segregated the industry of investment banking from that of commercial
15  See Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American
Corporate Finance (1994).
16  Another effect is a substantially greater use of equity than debt in the average corporate
capital structure.  Yet the disciplining forces of the equity market are also facilitated by an active
debt market, sometimes creating exceptions to that typical debt:equity ratio.  An American-style
leveraged buy-out (LBO), for example, is the acquisition of all or a substantial percentage of the
stock of another entity financed in material part by using or encumbering assets of that target
entity.  Common means of financing such buy-outs include the target advancing cash to the
acquier, pledging its assets as security for the acquier’s acquisition financing, or giving
guarantees of that indebtedness.  The capital structure of the target immediately following such a
leveraged acquisition often contains a debt:equity ratio much higher than average.
17  Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan and the
United States, 102 Yale L.J. 1927, 1939 (1993) [hereinafter Roe, Some Differences].
18   This may explain why there tends to be a  greater proportion of debt than equity in the
average corporate capital structure as compared to the debt-equity mix in the market model.
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banking.15
A principal consequence of these forces at the level of technical corporate governance is a
complex system of checks and balances on managerial power for shareholder protection.  Coupled
with a deeply ingrained principle of freedom of contract and judicial enforcement of contracts rights,
a shareholder primacy model within corporate law tended to emerge with the interests of other
participants in the corporation being addressed through contract.16
B.  The Bank/Labor Model
In contrast to this general market model epitomized by the US and UK corporate governance
and finance system is what can be called the bank/labor model, characteristic of many continental
European corporate finance models.  The central finance feature of this model is substantial
investment intermediation and ownership concentration, in sharp contrast to the market model’s
fragmentation.17
Banks act as financial intermediaries by accepting individual deposits and collecting them
for investment in corporations.  There tend to be far fewer such investing entities. With concentration
of ownership and debtholdings, there was far less pressure for the development of actively-
functioning, deep and liquid capital markets.18  Moreover, unlike with the US Glass-Steagall Act,
no formal or legal separation of commercial and investment banking prevent this concentration of
investment ownership.
This concentration of investment results in a powerful and small body of shareholder/debt
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holders whose dual position requires little in the way of regulatory governance mechanisms, and
certainly far less than the intricate system of checks and balances seen in the US-UK market model.
As the same bank tends to occupy seats as both shareholder and debt holder, the tension between
those interests essentially disappears and there is less pressure to choose between a shareholder
primacy model and some other model and therefore less need to develop any sort of system of checks
and balances or for a well-developed system of disclosure obligations.
There is also less need for such a system due to traditions that have put labor at the center of
the governance structure rather than as a participant whose interests are defined chiefly by contract.
European nations have a deep tradition of worker protection, evidenced in wage-setting policies, and
laws that make it difficult to fire workers (in contrast to the at-will employment rule of the common
law).  These sorts of forces may also explain the relatively narrower disparity in compensation levels
between senior executives and ordinary laborers, as compared to the market model.
The German (as well as the Dutch) version of this model formally elevates labor as a third
key participant in the leadership of a corporation.  German corporations operate with worker councils
in factories and in offices that must be consulted on a variety of matters concerning corporate policy
affecting them.
In terms of formal governance, German corporations generally have a two-tiered board
system consisting of a Management Board and a Supervisory Board.   The Management Board
(Vorstand) manages the corporation, represents it in its dealings with third parties, and submits
regular reports to the Supervisory Board.  The Supervisory Board (Aufsichstrat) appoints and
removes the members of the Management Board and oversees the management of the corporation.
Under German law, Supervisory Boards are typically composed one-half of employee-elected
representatives and one-half of shareholder-elected representatives.  While it cannot make
management decisions, the Supervisory Board may determine that certain actions or business
measures to be taken by the Management Board require its prior approval.
The German dual-board structure is based on the concept of co-determination
(Mitbestimmung).   At least in theory, labor and capital co-determine a corporation’s future course.
Labor’s formal representation on one board of a two-tiered board structure is intended to mean that
its interests are protected directly from within the corporate governance system rather than solely
through contract or governmental regulation or protection.  With concentrated shareholderings by
banks comprising the other half of the board, the separation of ownership from control characteristic
of the market shareholder model is also substantially absent in this bank/labor model.
French corporations, known as societe anonyme, are typically governed by a Directorate and
a Supervisory Board.  The Directorate has extensive powers to manage the business affairs of the
corporation.  The primary function of the Supervisory Board is to oversee the Directorate and to
exercise permanent control over the management of  the corporation.  The Supervisory Board also
chooses the members of the Directorate, determines the remuneration of the members of the
Directorate, authorizes any agreements between the corporation and the members of the Directorate
19  See EC Works Council Directive (relates to corporations with more than 1,000 total
employees which have 150 or more employees in at least two EC countries, not including the
UK).
20  In the following countries, the number of employees of a corporation triggering the
requirement of forming a work council and the obligation to consult it on pending changes of
control are as indicated: Belgium (100; pre-signing consultation and management must inform
shareholders of council’s views); France (5; pre-signing consultation); Germany (5; inform
council at the latest immediately following signing); The Netherlands (35; pre-signing
notification, and the councils have some power to suspend or block the transaction upon
application to a court).  Italy does not require worker councils and while Spain requires them it
does not require any action upon an impending change of control, but in both countries
executives of companies have substantial rights following a change in control.  See Clifford
Chance, Buying a European Business: A Guide to Negotiated Acquisitions in Western Europe
(2d ed. 1997).
21  See EC Acquired Rights Directive. 
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or the Supervisory Board and allocates attendance fees among its members.
Within this structure, while not as formal as the German co-determination model, the French
version also purports to take literally the statement that management owes its duties to the
corporation as a whole.  This statement is understood and treated as defining a stakeholder model
of corporate governance.  Managerial duties run to all participants in the corporation–shareholders
yes, but also lenders and labor.
Indeed in the bank-labor model, even sole shareholders sometimes may lack power to remove
or replace management, especially under two-tiered board structures such as are prevalent in
Germany and The Netherlands.  This is in part due to work council regulations adopted across
Europe. The EC mandates that all members (other than the UK, which opted out of the EC’s so-
called social chapter) require most of their corporations to establish procedures for employee
consultation and/or work council formation.19  
Many continental European countries have gone further than the EC mandates to require that
virtually all corporations establish and maintain worker councils with power to represent labor in
various ways vis-a-vis management.  Management is obligated to consult with these councils on
major corporate policy affecting labor interests, including layoff schemes and in many cases potential
changes of control.20  Galvanizing this labor element in the model, the EC also requires that
employment contracts “travel with” business assets when sold as a going concern, so that a buyer
of such assets is automatically subject to those agreements by operation of law.21
The Japanese variation on the bank/labor model deepens both the role of labor and the role
of lender banks in the governance structure compared to the European bank model. As in Europe,
22  See Ronald J. Gilson, Reflections in a Distant Mirror: Japanese Corporate Governance
Through American Eyes, 1998 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 203 [hereinafter, “Reflections”].
23  See Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Lifetime Employment: Labor Peace and the
Evolution of Japanese Corporate Governance (March 1998) (unpublished manuscript on file with
the author and available on the internet).
24  See Roe, Some Differences, supra.
25  E.g., Theodor Baums, Corporate Governance Systems in Europe: Differences and
Tendencies of Convergence (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
26  See generally, Roberto Romano, A Cautionary Note on Drawing Lessons from
Comparative Corporate Law, 102 Yale L.J. 2021 (1993).
-9-
banks tend to own the vast bulk of debt and equity of industrial companies.   The distinguishing
factual  characteristic is based on a production model called horizontal coordination.22  Workers tend
to be generalists in the production process and to engage in a substantial amount of information
sharing and mastery of learning throughout the system of production.  This limited specialization
calls for relatively high corporate investment in labor markets to develop human capital, both in
general and in specific applications at particular corporations.
Japanese corporations thus face higher risk of loss on investment from workers whom they
train at great expense and then may defect to other firms.  Workers also face the risk of acquiring
non-transportable firm-specific skills.  To address these risks, corporations and workers developed
the system of lifetime employment through which workers had permanent job security and
corporations benefitted from a concomitantly restricted labor market.23
Yet since this mutual security system was not in the form of an express binding contract,
additional structural protection was created through corporate cross-ownership.  Industrial
corporations in Japan own substantial percentages of the securities of other industrial corporations.
24 The resulting ownership concentration is even more acute than in the European model, with a
commensurate dilution of capital market disciplining power.
C.  Theories and Trade-Offs
As competition increasingly crosses borders in product markets, the topic of comparative
corporate governance has also begun to consider whether these differences affect corporate
competitiveness and the degree to which these various models are converging.25  Here important
normative questions are at stake, including (a) whether there is an optimal model, either one of the
existing models or a blend characterized by aspects of all of them and (b) whether these differences
are undergirded by distinctive and immutable cultural, political, or social differences that render
model optimality irrelevant except at a theoretical level.26 
27  E.g., Roberto Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law (1993); Frank A.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (1991).
28  E.g., William W. Bratton, The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual
Corporation, 87 Nw. L. Rev. 180 (1992).
29  Roe, supra.  A whole literature emerged that drew upon the science of path
dependence to explore these possibilities.
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At a theoretical level, some US corporate law scholars had interpreted the US experience as
a dynamic process of evolution toward a state of laudable maximum efficiency.  This state was
achieved through an exercise of corporate contracting and was recognizable once one noticed that
corporations were simply a nexus of contracts.27   All constituencies of the corporation held interests
in it that were defined by contract or something resembling contract and the force of contractual
freedom led to wealth maximizing relationships.  There was pretty much only one destiny for this
process and the US system was pretty much characterized by its qualities.
Tempting as it is to understand one’s past and present as moving on an inexorable path of
progress toward such a unique ideal, not all agreed.  Some countered these contentions on their own
terms,28 while others looked abroad and noticed that a variety of different models existed and
succeeded.  The inexorable path began to look more like just one path of many that could share a
pedestal of normative privilege.29
In the wake of these contrasting views of different models of corporate governance and
finance stands a theoretical stand-off.  Answers to the profound questions of optimality remain
elusive.  Indeed, as a matter of theory, the models suggest less about inevitabilities than about trade-
offs, principally between swiftness of adaptation and sureness of dislocation.
A key virtue of the shareholder-market model is its adaptability to changing environments.
Deep and liquid capital markets oriented towards shareholder interests facilitate fast responses to
deteriorating financial conditions.  The external monitoring function of strong capital markets
manifests itself pretty much on a daily basis in very many mundane ways.  Volume of shares traded,
vast quantities of detailed analysis and reporting by financial analysts and business journalists,
corporate public relations departments and chief executive officers devoting substantial efforts to
information dissemination and interpretation are some examples. 
More dramatic evidence of systemic adaptability hastened by the external monitoring of
capital markets comes from innovations in techniques for improving corporate performance.  The
proliferation in the US of junk bond financing was used to wage hostile takeover battles that forced
changes within corporate America in the 1980s.  A high volume of management buy outs, especially
leveraged buyouts, during the same period did the same.  In the 1990s, waves of consolidations and
takeovers financed by equity securities, along with record numbers of initial public offerings of
securities, show the US capital markets at work in raising and allocating funds to improve
30  See Gilson, Reflections, supra.
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performance.
These sorts of capital market monitoring activities also translate into other dramatic evidence
of the adaptability of business within the market model.  Reengineering, downsizing, restructuring,
outsourcing, spin offs, split ups, mergers, leaner organizational structures and so on are not only
buzzwords (they certainly are that) but labels for real activities of change that take place regularly
among US and UK corporations across the decades.
Perhaps the most striking evidence of the adaptability of the US-UK model is the comeback
of corporate America that began in the early 1980s.  American industry lagged that of Japan and
conventional wisdom had begun to hold that the Japanese main bank model was the way to
outperform–with lifetime employment for horizontal coordination and cross-shareholdings.  Then
corporate America rebounded with a vengeance, swiftly and surely, producing  the longest expansion
in the post-war economy, while Japan and the rest of Asia spun into financial crisis.30
Such swift adaptation does not come without a cost of course.  The very slogans of
downsizing and re-engineering capture some of the fall out that workers, communities and other
corporate constituents face.  Workers are fired or laid off.  Host towns to closed corporate plants fall
into economic abysses.  Severe ripple effects can run through local economies and sometimes
through the national economy as a whole.  The weak and the losers are ground out by the market
model of corporate finance and governance into the dustbins of history.
This kind of fall-out has been an especially sensitive issue among European countries whose
history and social politics place a far greater value on the security of workers over the short term and
whose laws requiring work councils, setting wages and imposing substantial restrictions on an
employer’s ability to fire workers can impair adaptation. This does not mean that economies and
corporations of those countries do not both suffer and rebound from economic malaise.  What seems
to differ is that the speed with which adaptation occurs is slower and possibly the degree of severity
of the economic hardship is either less or spread across more sectors of the economy or constituents
of the corporation.
With these trade-offs and the associated characterization of the key differences between these
models in terms of constituency identification (shareholders verus stakeholders) and finance traits
(disaggregated versus concentrated), prescriptions may be urged at normative or theoretical levels
as to which model would better suit the coming world of global interconnectedness.  However, the
reality of global corporate governance and finance resembles less the abstract models sketched here
and something more far more overlapping and convergent, as the next Part’s examination of trends,
traditions, and practices suggests.
31  The world would witness replication of the similar practice of competition among the
states within the United States.  See Terence L. Blackburn, The Unification of Corporate Laws:
The United States, the European Community and the Race to Laxity, 3 Geo. Mason Indep. L.
Rev. 1 (1994).  On that phenomenon in the US, see Roberto Romano, The State Competition
Debate in Corporate Law, 8 Cardozo L. Rev. 709 (1987); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 469
(1987).  The classic stances on the virtues of such competition are known as the Cary-Winter
debate.  Compare William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware,
83 Yale L. J. 663 (1974) with Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection and the
Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. Leg. Stud. 251 (1977).
32  See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law
(Dec. 5, 1997) (unpublished manuscript available on the internt and from Columbia Law School)
(Columbia conference “Are Corporate Governance Systems Converging?”).
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II. Global Corporate Governance
Multinational and transnational firms have to be domiciled somewhere yet they compete
everywhere.  The choice of domicile can entail different governance structures, due to legal, cultural,
economic, or political constraints, which vary across domiciles.  That choice can affect the entity’s
competitiveness in global markets vis-a-vis entities domiciled elsewhere.  If it does, one can expect
mobile entities organized in disadvantaged regimes to proselytize for change or simply go elsewhere.
31 Increasingly keen competition among product markets throughout the world should effect requisite
discipline without regard to domestic (national/internal) financial market design.  On the other hand,
there are strong links between product markets and methods and corporate finance markets and
governance structures.  After all, for example, a key explanation for the distinctive governance model
of Japan is precisely its horizontal coordination method of production.
In the past couple of decades this tension has been resolved toward substantial global
harmonization, as countries around the world spruce up their corporate governance structures with
best practices from elsewhere.32  Moreover, while global competition in product markets has raged
for many decades international capital markets had tended to be isolated from each other.  This is
changing.  Financial markets across borders increasingly compete with one another as investors
(suppliers of capital) look across borders for additional investment opportunities.   Simultaneously,
corporations (and other  organizations) seek lowest cost capital from any market in the world where
it can be obtained.  So the isolation of capital markets is disappearing and real head to head
competition among financial markets has ensued.
A robust competition that is proceeding among corporations in product, labor and capital
markets is being replicated spontaneously in a robust competition for types of corporate governance
models.  That competition occurs as an immediate and direct by-product of competition in these
other markets and has produced trends suggesting an increasing blending and integration of corporate
governance practices around the world.  On the other hand, there  are obstacles to harmonization and
33  See Amir N. Licht, International Diversity in Securities Regulation: Roadblocks on the
Way to Convergence, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 227 (1998).
34  See Corporate Governance Update, 5 Corp. Governance: Int’l Rev. 256 (1997); see
also Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function
(Dec. 5, 1997) (unpublished manuscript available on the internet and from Columbia Law
School) (Columbia conference “Are Governance Systems Converging?”).
35  The following countries substantially relaxed their foreign investment control laws in
the indicated year and now call for the notification indicated:  France (1996, foreign investors
need to file a declaration of investment with the Treasury Department of the Ministry of the
Economy); Spain (1992, foreign investors must report to General Directorate of Commercial
Policy and Foreign Investment, except that for investments exceeding approximately $3.8 million
they also must receive prior administrative clearance); Germany (19xx, report to Bundesbank);
Belgium (19xx, report to Central Bank); The Netherlands (19xx, report to Central Bank).  See
Clifford Chance, Buying a European Business, supra note.
36  E.g., France (investments in governmental or public authorities, research and arms);
Spain (investments in aviation, radio, television, telecommunications, gaming, arms, and national
defense).  Id.
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systemic rigidities that preserve substantial diversity among national laws governing corporations.33
To that extent, it is highly doubtful that a single harmonic model ever will emerge, but the direction
is towards that end rather than away from it.34 
A. Trends
The European Union is itself a corporate finance/governance integration in all sorts of ways.
In the deepest way, adoption of a single currency will harmonize the fundamental competitive
because in a single currency area, productivity differentials–the fruits of technological advancement
and higher investment for example–are shared.  Business expense differentials, particularly wages,
should tend to evaporate.  The process is just beginning with adoption of the euro at present
permitting sovereign exchange in local currencies, with those currencies to be abandoned within just
a few years. 
Nearly as profound, throughout Europe barriers to cross-border capital flows have been
greatly diminished.  A series of EC Directives seeks to compel abolition of foreign investment
controls.  Member states have enthusiastically responded to this call by relaxing substantially their
historical controls.  In general, the remaining restrictions are limited to notification requirements35
or to specified sectors posing national security or public health, safety and welfare concerns.36  Many
European countries have simply retained authority to implement such controls without any being in
37  E.g., Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany and the UK (although in the UK the
Secretary of State is empowered to prohibit a non-UK resident from acquiring control of UK
manufacturing entities if allowing it would be contrary to the public interest).  Id.
38  See Council Directive No. 78/660 O.J. (L 222) 11 (1978) (Fourth EC Company Law
Directive).
39  See Council Directive No. 83/349 26 O.J. (L 193) 1 (1983) (Seventh EC Company
Law Directive).
40  See Singhof & Seiler, at 537, n.166; see also Terence L. Blackburn, The Societas
Europea: The Evolving European Corporation Statute, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 695 (1993) (critical
appraisal of the original proposal).
41  An early EU attempt at adopting governance structures that would have provided for
employee representation on corporate boards was dropped in the face of strong opposition.  See
Proposal for a Fifth Company Law Directive, 1983 O.J. (C240) 2.  Similarly, an early proposal to
compel financial disclosure for the benefit of employees was fiercely opposed and ultimately
abandoned.  See Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on Procedures for Informing and
Consulting the Employees of Undertakings with Complex Structure, in Particular Transnational
Undertakings, 1980 O.J. (C297) 3.
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effect or in regular use.37
Within Europe also accounting rules are harmonized along a series of fundamental principles.
These include a requirement of uniform formats of financial statement presentation; common
valuation principles, including historical cost and accrual accounting principles and the principle of
conservatism (called prudence); a general mandate that the financial statements show true and fair
value; an annual audit; public filings;38 and consolidation principles.39
Against these trends in Europe are periodic instances of apparent resistance to harmonization.
There are 13 EC Directors dealing with European Company Law, as well as a proposal to create a
European Corporation (“societas europaea”) that would supplement but not substitute for the
national corporate form in individual states, but neither is currently among the EC’s high priorities.40
On a few occasions, particularly early on in EU convergence efforts, proposals for employee board
representation derailed adoption of some integrated governance proposals.41  Much of this resistance
emanates from the UK, which has for decades debated whether its future will be better served by
alliances along an Anglo-Saxon US-UK axis or along a continental European EU axis.  Whatever
obstacles this ambivalence may seem to pose for EU harmony, the UK has actually produced
microcosmic convergence by drawing on both. 
US corporate law, both common law and statutory law, drew upon Anglo-Saxon traditions
and then refined them.  The UK has in turn recaptured them in its 1992 Cadbury Report on corporate
42  Report of the Committee on Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Cadbury
Report) (Dec. 1, 1992).
43  Committee on Corporate Governance Final Report (Hampel Report) (Jan. 1998).
44  See Joann S. Lublin & Sara Calian, Activist Pension Funds Create Alliance Across
Atlantic to Press Lackluster Firms, Wall St. J., Nov. 23, 1998 at A4 (reporting on alliance
between CalPers, the largest US pension fund, and Hermes Pensions Management Ltd., the
largest UK pension-fund manager, together holding nearly $1 trillion in investments, to cooperate
“across the oceans to affect corporate governance”).
45  Olivier Pastre, Corporate Governance: The End of “L’Exception Francaise”?, 1998
Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 79.
46  E.g., France to Sell Up to 30% Of Thomson Multimedia, N.Y. Times, July 31, 1998, at
D3.
47  See Pastre, supra.
48  Id.
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governance,42 followed in 1998 by the final version of that report renamed the Hampel Report in
1998.43  Both seek to identify “best practices” among global corporations and tend to pick up on
technical innovations in regulatory corporate governance adopted in the US, such as increasing the
number and roles of independent directors, creating board audit and nominating committees
comprised mostly of independent directors and other governance devices heralded and adopted in
the US.  Institutional investors that proselytize for these sorts of corporate governance reforms from
the UK and the US have also joined forces to promote global corporate governance efforts.44
The UK’s substantial role in Europe coupled with these UK links to US corporate governance
has tended to magnetize continental models toward the market model.  Consider what has been
happening in France.  If French corporate governance and finance have been characterized by the
stakeholder model and financial intermediation, French capitalism has been characterized by a state-
dominated industrial policy, firms of far smaller average size than in other capitalist countries, and
an industrial elite recruited not from within industry but from outside it.45   In this environment
capital markets have been limited in depth and in monitoring capability. 
This French model is being revised in ways that resemble a market model, beginning with
a loosening of the state’s hold on industry through privitization in the face of globalization and
liberalization.46  The number of small shareholders is also growing and, following the UK, technical
governance reforms based on US models have been instituted widely.47   Audit and compensation
committees are forming across French corporate boards, minority shareholders are taking on
increasingly important roles, and economic transparency is being enhanced through superior flows
in information quantity and quality.48
49  Mark J. Roe, German Codetermination and German Securities Markets, 1998 Colum.
Bus. L. Rev. 167 [hereinafter, “German Codetermination”]; Roe, Some Differences, supra note ,
at 1942-43.
50  Id.
51  Id.
52  See Survey, Japanese Finance, The Economist, June 28, 1997; Governance Debate Hits
Far East, The Corporate Governance Advisor, May/June 1988 at 32.
53  Id.
54  For a few excellent articles on international regulatory competition in securities
regulation, see James D. Cox, Regulatory Competition in Securities Markets: An Approach for
Reconciling Japanese and United States Disclosure Philosophies, 16 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L.
Rev. 149 (1993); James D. Cox, Rethinking U.S. Securities Laws in the Shadow of International
Regulatory Competition, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1992, at 157; Bevis Longstreth, A
Look at the SEC’s Adaptation to Global Market Pressure, 33 Colum. J. Transnt’l L. 319 (1995);
on regulatory competition in general, see also William J. Bratton & Joseph McCaHery, N.C. L.
Rev. (1995).
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The German model of “co-determination” with formal worker representation on the
Supervisory Board looks radically different from the typical conception of the US-UK model as one
dedicated to the best interests of the shareholders.  The practice within most German Supervisory
Boards, however, means pretty much only access to information and a voice at the table rather than
any real decision-making authority on operations, finance or other corporate matters.49   Indeed, the
tendency has been for Managerial Boards, composed of managers and shareholders, to dilute the
power of the labor-dominated Supervisory Boards.50  Ironically, this has been achieved in part with
some classical devices of corporate governance such as the use of committees and strategic
channeling of information.51 
Japan has also been moving toward a shareholder market model and away from long term
employment commitments for horizontal coordination.  There is increased recognition that profit
maximizing strategies are consistent with the protections these devices provide.52  More and more
Japanese workers–particularly younger workers–have indicated that they do not expect to stay with
one employer for more than a few years at a time, let alone maintain lifetime employment with a
single firm.53
 The forces of regulatory competition are also at work in promoting sovereign state
competition through private use of forum-shopping techniques that effectively locate business
organizations in host countries with attractive laws.54  To give a simple example, most European
countries do not permit tax deductions for amortization expense of goodwill or other intangibles.
55  See Clifford Chance, Buying a European Business, supra at 20-27.
56  See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial? A Political and Economic Analysis,
84 Nw. L. Rev. 542 (1990) (arguing that state corporate in the US is trivial as it can be contracted
around to enable corporations to adopt pretty much any governance structure desired).
57  See Alan Cowell, French Agree to a European Stock Exchange, N.T. Times, Nov. 20,
1998, at C2 (the French announcement was accompanied by statements from London and
Frankfurt indicating that the announcement may have been somewhat premature).
58  Id. (NY Times, Nov. 20, 1998).
59  See Lee H. Radebaugh et al., Foreign Stock Exchange Listings: A Case Study of
Daimler-Benz, 6 J. Int’l Fin. Mgmt. & Acct. 158 (1995).
60  See James L. Cochrane, Are U.S. Regulatory Requirements for Foreign Firms
Appropriate?, 17 Fordham Int’l L. J. S58 (1994); James A. Fanto & Roberta S. Karmel, A Report
on the Attitudes of Foreign Companies Regarding a U.S. Listing, 3 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin., 51
(1997).
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But some do (Italy, the Netherlands, Spain) and assets acquired elsewhere (say France) can
subsequently be sold to an entity in one of those countries and simultaneously leased back to the
French entity.55  The sale-leaseback device neutralizes the cross-border difference, despite anything
France (or the other country for that matter) was trying to accomplish.  To that extent, the legal
differences can in effect be contracted around and end up as trivial.56
European capital markets are also deepening.  The Frankfurt and London Stock Exchanges
announced in July 1998 a plan to integrate their facilities and to permit trading of each other’s listed
securities on the other’s exchange.  France quickly announced its disappointment at being left out
of the initial plans and the Frankfurt-London alliance as quickly announced that the Paris bourse
would be a welcome addition to the alliance (although as a 20% player compared with 40% for each
of the founding exchanges).  Not long thereafter, France made the unilateral announcement of its
inclusion in the emerging pan-European exchange,57 and exchange officials in Milan, Madrid,
Amsterdam and Brussels echoed eagerness to participate in the venture that the London exchange
estimates would list companies with aggregate market capitalization of $5.5 trillion (compared with
the New York Stock Exchange’s $8.7 trillion).58
There is further evidence of integration in securities listing and trading.  Stock exchanges
have for years been pushing for harmonization or relaxation to enable global listing, most famously
achieved by Daimler-Benz’s listing on the New York Stock Exchange.59  These efforts continue, and
with increasing success.60  SAP, a 25-year old German software firm listed on the New York Stock
Exchange in early August 1998, exactly ten years to the day after its initial public offering on the
61  The company name stands for  Systems, Applications, Products and its major product
is the innovative enterprise resource planning (ERP) software, which can run a company’s entire
business process and is used by most of the world’s major corporations, including Microsoft. 
The product and the company’s success earned the company the nickname “Germany’s
Microsoft.”
62  See The Financial Times, Aug. 3, 1998.
63  SAP reportedly shrugged off the usual “stuffy Germany” style of corporate governance
and instead cultivated an environment characterized by entrepreneurship, speedy growth, and
informality, making it more at home in Silicon Valley than in the Rhine.  The company is also
multi-national, with research labs in Palo Alto, Tokyo, Moscow and India.  One-fourth of its
investors are American, 40% of its business is in the United States and so are its biggest rivals
(Oracle and PeopleSoft).  Along with the American characteristics, moreover, SAP has a more
German cultural characteristic: “good programmers get paid as much as top line managers.”  Id.
64  See Bloomberg News, Broker-Dealers Plan Electronic Options Market, The Houston
Chronicle, Nov. 11, 1998.
65  Rather than require the physical presence of people in a single location conducting live
auctions as exiting capital markets do, an all-electronic market conducts such auctions solely on
computer screens and thus obliterates the significance of physical location.  Auction markets
operate by a customer instructing a broker to effect a trade, who submits the trade to the
exchange floor where a crowd of traders bid on it in an “open-outcry” auction overseen by a
specialist in the subject security there to fill orders when others won’t.  Electronic trading
operates in a similar way except the auction is conducted through bids announced via computer
rather than human voice.  Id.  See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, Capital Market Theory,
Mandatory Disclosure and Price Discovery, 51 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 843 (1994).
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Frankfurt Stock Exchange.61  SAP is widely characterized as having generated “US-style growth”
and “US-style rewards.”62   Its listing on the NYSE was characterized by senior executives as
showing that SAP had “outgrown” the Frankfurt stock market and also showed that SAP is a
transnational entity–one combining features of a variety of governance models.63 
Signs of the international times in securities trading include creation of the International
Securities Exchange (ISE) announced in November 1998.  On-line brokerage firm E-trade and a
group of broker-dealers led by Adirondack Trading Partners announced their intention to invest
about $80 million in establishing this all electronic options exchange.64  The founders touted their
ability to slash costs of trading substantially, but as important is the ability to conduct trading in
staggering sums of billions and trillions of dollars solely through electronic means that transcend
geographic boundaries.65  The ISE is by no means the first to inaugurate electronic trading, but in its
efforts to emulate the widespread use of such trading in Europe, its commitment cements this new
66  See Steven M. Sears, Big US Options Exchanges See Threat From a Planned All-
Electronic System, Wall St. J., Nov. 23, 1998, at B13I (reporting that the ISE “hopes to mimic
the success of European electronic exchanges by luring customers with lower fees”).
67  E.g., Note, The New American Universal Bank, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1310 (1997); James
R. Smoot, Bank Operating Subsidiaries: Free at Last or More of the Same?, 46 DePaul L. Rev.
651 (1997); H. Rodgin Cohen, Section 20 Affiliates of Bank Holding Companies, 1 N.C.
Banking Inst. 113 (1997).
68  See Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners,  supra.   Mergers included Nationsbank-
Montgomery Securities; Bank America-Robertson Stpehens (later sold when Nationsbank bought
BofA); Travelers-Citicorp; Bankers Trust-Alex. Brown.  Other equity ownership trends in the US
may suggest convergence as well.  See Roe, Some Differences, supra note at 1965 (“US firms
may be evolving–weakly and unevenly–toward the German and Japanese style of ownership” and
the “next natural evolutionary stage of American corporate finance might be the entrance of
financial institutions into corporate boardrooms”).
69  See infra text accompanying notes [Part III.D].
70  E.g., The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
71  See generally Uriel Procaccia, Crafting a Corporate Code from Scratch, 17 Cardozo L.
Rev. 629, 641-43 (1996) (discussing Israel’s approach to derivative suits as a corporate
governance tool); see infra text accompanying notes [Part III.D].
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era of globally-connected securities trading.66 
Trends in the US are also taking pages from models elsewhere.  First, there has been a
softening of the boundaries between investment and commercial banking. The Federal Reserve
Board in December 1996 increased the amount of investment banking income a commercial bank
can earn from investment banking subsidiaries from 10% to 25%.  These so-called Section 20 subs
engage in capital markets businesses and investment banking.67  This change contributed
substantially to the wave of mergers between commercial and investment banks in the ensuing
period, and breaks down an historical cause of ownership fragmentation in the US.68
Second, the US litigation system often seems to encourage undue volumes of shareholder
lawsuits against management in class actions as well through derivative suits whereas most legal
systems put substantial restrictions on such suits.69  While there is little reason to believe that such
litigation will decline materially in the US, it is equally clear that protections against litigation abuse
have been pursued in the US.70  Other countries that may increasingly look toward litigation to
enforce corporate governance principles will increasingly be able to adapt these and other sorts of
built-in anti-abuse systems.71
72  A general trend towards harmonization of international accounting standards, also
suggested a few pages earlier, is reflected in accounting textbooks and professional literature. 
E.g., Sideny J. Gray & Lee H. Redebaugh, International Accounting and Multinational
Enterprises (4th ed. 1997); Gerhard G. Mueller, et al., Accounting: An International Perspective
(4th ed. 1997); Shahrokh M. Saudagaran & Gary M. Meek, A Review of Research on the
Relationship Between International Capital Markets and Financial Reporting by Multinational
Firms, 16 J. Acct. Lit. 127-59 (1997).
73  National Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996, Section 509.
74  See International Accounting Standards 7 (International Accounting Standards Comm.
1997).
75  Report on Promoting Global Preeminence of American Securities Markets (Oct. 1997)
<www.wec.gov/news/studies/acctgsp.htm>
76  The SEC’s support emphasizes that any international accounting standards must be
comprehensive, produce comparability and transparency, provide for full disclosure, and be
capable of being rigorously interpreted and applied.  Id.  Indeed, Chairman Levitt’s broad-based
initiative to crack-down on earnings management abuses among US corporations (see SEC
Release and web site) is seen by many as a response to the increasing attractiveness of
international harmonization of accounting standards that the SEC wants the US to lead rather
than follow.  See Elizabeth MacDonald, SEC’s Levitt Pushes Harder for Changes in Fiscal
Reporting, and Some Cry Foul, Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1998, at A2 & A10 (“the SEC fears that the
growing economic globalization will put pressure on U.S. regulators to conform to international
accounting rules, which are generally looser”).
77  Declaration of G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Oct. 30, 1998 (the
IASC’s proposals can promote “greater transparency and openness in the financial operations of
individual countries, of financial and corporate institutions, and of the international financial
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Third, accounting principles in the US are being harmonized with those prevalent world-
wide.72   In October 1996, the US Congress passed the National Securities Markets Improvements
Act of 1996, which among other things required the US Securities and Exchange Commission to
report to Congress on progress being made in developing international accounting standards.73  The
SEC has been working with the International Accounting Standards Committee for nearly a decade
to promulgate a core set of accounting pronouncements constituting a comprehensive basis of
generally accepted accounting principles.74  In October 1997, the SEC published a report to the US
Congress on the progress of the the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC).75
The SEC joins organizations throughout the world in supporting the IASC’s initiatives.76  The
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of the G7 countries announced their support of the
IASC and encouraged it to complete its proposed set of core principles by early 1999.77  The World
institutions”).
78  Jim Kelly, Big Five Criticized Over Global Audit Standards: World Bank Action May
Speed Up International Code, The Financial Times, p. 1 (Oct. 19, 1998).  The President of the
World Bank, James D. Wolfensohn, made the same point more broadly in a speech to the joint
annual meeting of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund on October 6, 1998
(calling for new development framework with internationally recognized accounting and auditing
standards for the private sector).
79  Speech of Tony Blair to the New York Stock Exchange, Sept. 21, 1998.
80  Speech of Robert E. Rubin to a Dow Jones/Wall Street Journal Conference, Oct. 1,
1998 (calling for “a new openness in international finance”).
81  E.g., David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 Ind. L. Rev. 223 (1991); Lawrence
E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency
Statutes, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 579 (1992); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Progressive Corporate Law (1995)
(collecting numerous articles).  Prescriptions related to the idea of corporate social responsibility
include advocacy of altruistic capitalism, a sort of constrained profit maximization mandate.  See
Elliott J. Weiss, Social Regulation of Business Activity: Reforming the Corporate Governance
System to Resolve an Institutional Impasse, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 343 (1981).
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Bank has requested the world’s Big Five international auditing firms to insist that financial
statements be prepared in accordance with international accounting standards.78   Exemplifying
leading voices from around the world, Tony Blair, Prime Minster of  the UK,79 and Robert E. Rubin,
Treasury Secretary of the US,80 also have emphasized that a key part of the global financial system
must be development and implementation of international accounting standards.
B.  Traditions
The trends summarized in the preceding Section are operating as forces to harmonize some
of the finance aspects of the models sketched in Part I.  As for the constituency characterization of
those models, the models are more capacious than the highly-generalized summary in Part I suggests
and the capacity for overlap has increasingly been filling up rather than contracting. 
Corporate social responsibility remains an important dimension of US corporate
governance.81  The simple argument that shareholder-based profit maximization lifts the boats of all
other participants has been supplemented by more direct efforts to do so.  Scores of substantial
organizations promote this more direct approach to corporate constituencies on issues including
affirmative action, child labor, downsizing, environmental, fair wages, privacy, sexual harassment,
82  E.g., Francesco Cantarella, The Growth of Corporate Responsibility Committees, 20
The Corporate Board (Nov.-Dec. 1998) (see also <www.corpsocialsol.com>).
83  Id.
84  See Business for Social Responsibility, <http://www.bsr.org/bsrfacts.htm>
85  See Maria O. Hylton, “Socially Responsible” Investing: Doing Good Versus Doing
Well in an Inefficient Market, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1 (1992).
86  See Lewis D. Solomon, On the Frontier of Capitalism: Implementation of 
Humanomics by Modern Publicly Held Corporations: A Critical Assessment, 50 Wash. & Lee L.
Rev. 1625 (1993); see also Lewis D. Solomon, The Future of Business Organizations, 20
Cardozo L. Rev. xxx (forthcoming 1999).
87  See Business for Social Responsibility, <http://www.bsr.org/bsrfacts.htm>
88  See supra text accompanying notes [Part I.A].
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and work-family life balance.82  They do so through advocating programs including employee
training and assistance, mission statements, and social responsibility audits.83
Leading groups include Business for Social Responsibility, an organization founded in 1992
and comprised of over 1,400 corporate members with annual revenues exceeding $1 trillion, total
employees of nearly 5 million, and featuring such brand corporate names as AT&T, Bristol-Myers
Squibb, Coca-Cola, DuPont, Federal Express, Home Depot, Motorola, Polaroid and Time-Warner.84
Large numbers of mutual funds and other institutional investors commit themselves to investing only
in socially responsible enterprises, some–but not all–of whom claim to believe that investing this
way can also be shareholder wealth-maximizing.85  Many corporations follow suit by emphasizing
their social responsibility–not just the well-known exemplars of the traditional left such as Ben &
Jerry’s and Body Shop86–but also companies including Philips-Van Heusen Corporation, headed by
CEO Bruce Klatsky, an advisor on US trade policy to the Bush and Reagan administrations, as well
as Hasbro, Reebok and Wal-Mart.87
These positions are entirely consistent with US state law, for US state laws mandate that
directors act in the best interests of the “shareholders and the corporation as a whole.”  While often
read to mean that shareholders are the primary beneficiaries of director duties,88 the language easily
and often extends the benefit to others including creditors, communities and workers.  And while
German law is seen to take more seriously the idea that beneficiaries of those duties include
corporate constituents other than shareholders, that law also forbids directors from acting contrary
to shareholder interests and indeed often requires precisely acting in the “aggregated shareholder
89  See Bernd Singhof & Oliver Seiler, Shareholder Participation in Corporate
Decisionmaking Under German Law: A Comparative Analysis, 24 Brooklyn J. Int’l L. 493, 550
(1998):
Management’s fiduciary duties toward the company under German law corporate
law are repeatedly referred to as Loyalitats-und Treuepflichten.  Since the
shareholders are the ‘ultimate owners’ of each corproation, courts and scholars
interpret the somewhat sweeping language of Aktiengesetz section 93 paragraph 1
[the statutory mandate that directors act “with the care of a diligent and
conscientious manager”] as primarily embracing the notion of aggregated
shareholder interest and long-term profit maximiation.  However, there is a
longstanding debate in Germany about the strong emphasis on protecting
shareholder interests.
Id. 
90  See Singhof & Seiler, supra at 553 (citing Marc von Samson-Himmelstjerna,
Personliche Haftung der organe von Kapitalgesellschaften, 89 Zeitschrift fur Vergleichende
Rechtswissenschaften 288, 303 (199) as “indicating the similarity of the U.S. and German
standards”) but also noting others who argue that Germany fiduciary duty “falls short of the
standard set in American case law and statutes”).
91  The DGCL provides that the board of directors has the ultimate responsibility for
managing the business and affairs of a corporation.  DGCL § 141(a).  The duty of care requires
the exercise of an informed business judgment, taken to mean that directors must inform
themselves of all material information reasonably available to them.   Having become so
informed, they then must act with requisite care in the discharge of their duties.   Liability of
directors for breach of the duty of care in some circumstances requires a finding by a court that
the directors were grossly negligent.  See Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 688 (Del. 1985).  
92  See Singhof & Seiler, supra, at 550 (AktG § 93(1) requires directors to act “with the
care of a diligent and conscientious manager”).
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interest.”89
US and German corporate law therefore contemplate protection of all corporate
constituencies.90  Both prescribe this protection by imposing on management the duties of care and
loyalty.  Both US and German corporate law treat the duty of care as a species of what is
recognizable as a quasi-negligence standard, with US states requiring the exercise of “fully-informed
business judgment”91 and German law requiring directors to exercise the standard of care of a
“prudent and diligent businessperson.”92 In the US, state court judges defer to managerial decision-
making under the business judgment rule so long as directors act in good faith and without a conflict
of interest.  Under German law there is no business judgment rule and directors bear the burden of
93  See Singhof & Seiler, supra at 552 & n.243.
94  Stated in the more usual terms, the duty of loyalty requires that directors and officers
place the corporation’s interests above her or his own interests.  See RMBCA Subchapter F,
Introductory Comment.
95  See Singhof & Seiler, supra at 552.
96  E.g., NYBCL § 713.
97  Loans made to Supervisory Board members must be approved by the Board without
the borrowing member’s vote.  See
98  See John H. Crabb, French Business Enterprises: Basic Legislative Texts.
99  E.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 820 (construed in Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini
Co., 241 P.2d 66 Cal. 1952)); DGCL § 144 (construed in Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218
(Del. 1976) and in Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400 (Del. 1987)); RMBCA § 8.31 (construed
in Cookies Food Prod., Inc. v. Lakes Warehouse Distrib., Inc., 430 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 1988)).
100  See
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proving they have discharged their duties.93
The duty of loyalty under US state laws requires directors to subordinate their personal
interests to the interests of the corporation when those interests conflict,94 and again German law (as
well as French law) is to a similar effect.95 Specific applications of this general duty do vary between
these domiciles, yet the variation is not much more pronounced than the nuanced variation across
states within the US as the following four examples suggest.
First, many US states authorize boards to approve loans to directors without shareholder or
other constituency approval, often without any restrictions on board authority to do so other than a
requirement that the board determine that the loans benefit the corporation.96  German law requires
that loans to directors exceeding one months salary be approved by the Supervisory Board.97   French
law flatly forbids corporate loans to directors as well as corporate guanrantees of direct borrowings
by them or on their behalf.98
Second, most US state laws adopt a textured set of rules governing other interested director
transactions under which such transactions are generally permissible or at least largely insulated from
judicial review if: (1) the interest is disclosed and a majority of disinterested directors consent; (2)
the interest is disclosed and holders of a majority of shares entitled to vote consent; and/or (3) the
transaction is fair to the corporation at the time it is authorized.99  German law contains the
somewhat clearer requirement that for any transaction between the corporation and a member of the
Management Board, the corporation must be represented by the Supervisory Board.100  On the other
101  Id.
102  See
103  E.g., Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939); see also ALI, Principles of Corporate
Governance § 5.05(b) (1994) (defining corporate opportunity).
104  See
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hand, German law does not go on to police the process or substance of the resulting transaction other
than through general rules against fraud.101  French law requires advance approval of interested
director transactions by the Supervisory Board and an evaluation and report by the corporation’s
auditors to be furnished to the shareholders.102
A branch of the US duty of loyalty imposes limitations on transactions directors and officers
may exploit in their non-corporate capacity if those transactions have certain characteristics–such
as being in the corporation’s line of business–indicating that the corporation should be given the
opportunity to exploit the transaction.103  German law contains similar restrictions against members
of the Management Board engaging in competition with the corporation without the approval of the
Supervisory Board.104
The differences in the duties of care and loyalty between the US (and the UK, which is
similar) and Germany (and France) are thus far more subtle and less pronounced than often
recognized.  This is particularly so in that specific identification of beneficiaries of the basic duties
of care and loyalty matter very little in settings like director loans, interested transactions and
corporate opportunities.  The prescriptions are meant to address the content of those duties rather
than their discrete beneficiaries.
In that sense, they are vertical governance mechanisms intended to preserve and expand the
size of the corporate pie rather than address the manner in which the pie (whatever its size) is sliced
up and allocated.  Questions of pie size pit managerial interests against the interests of all other
constituencies of the corporation and it should be unsurprising that these vertical corporate
governance mechanisms differ so little across borders of advanced economic countries. And far from
impairing governance convergence they obviously promote it.  The potentially more contrasting case
concerns situations where allocation is at stake, a problem of horizontal corporate governance and
most potentially visible in the case of threats to corporate control.
C.  Threats in Fact
In the context of threatened  changes of control and related defensive actions, most US state
laws impose either or both a heightened standard of duty upon directors or a heightened standard of
judicial review of director conduct, in each case concerning whether the directors acted to get the
best deal for shareholders.  No such heightened standards exist under German law, at least at
105  The absence of any such standards may in part be due to the absence of many
opportunities to develop them–an absence likely to change as increasing numbers of mergers,
particularly involving cross-border entities, involving German companies occur.
106  Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985).
107  Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
108  Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroluem Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985); see Time, 571
A.2d at 1153; Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1285 n. 35; see also Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500
A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985) (not upsetting director decision to adopt poison pill intended to
deter certain takeovers that threaten various nonshareholder constituencies). 
109  Time, 571 A.2d at 1143, n.4, 1145; see also Charles M. Yablon, Corporate Culture in
Takeovers, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 719 (1997).   This position is not limited to Delaware courts.  See
Herald Co. v. Sewall, 472 F.2d 1081, 1094-95 (10th Cir. 1972) (upholding takeover defenses
adopted by directors of newspaper publisher and noting the corporation had a duty to its readers).
110  Revlon permits consideration of other constituencies so long as it is “rationally related
to benefits accruing to the stockholders,” Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180,–a standard that is not all that
tough to meet.  See Lawrence A. Cunningham & Charles M. Yablon, Delaware Fiduciary Duty
Law After QVC and Technicolor: A Unified Standard (And the End of Revlon Duties?), 49 Bus.
Law. 1593 (1994).
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present,105 and instead directors are simply expected not to act counter to the stockholders’ interest
and to have due regard for the common interest.
The degree to which this heightened standard in the US separates the US model from the
German model should not be overstated, however.  Many states also empower directors to consider
the interests of non-shareholder constituencies in some circumstances.  True, Delaware case law
routinely emphasizes the shareholder primacy norm, as the rhetoric of cases such as Revlon106 and
QVC107 suggest.  Yet those very cases mediate the rhetorical norm by permitting directors to consider
“the impact [of their decisions] on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers,
employees, and perhaps even the community generally).”108  This is consistent with a general
principle of corporate law that allows directors to do so as long as the effect on shareholders is not
too great.
Delaware law has sometimes gone even further, as when it accepted arguments made by
Time Inc. directors who had resisted an unwanted takeover in part on the ground that doing so was
necessary to preserve its culture of journalistic integrity.109   Even under the most rigorous judicial
review of board actions in takeover contexts–that to which Revlon’s shareholder value maximization
rhetoric applies–Delaware law gives directors wide berth.110  It does not  require any particular action
111  See Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1286.
112  See In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 94,194 at 91,714 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31), appeal refused, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1989).
113  E.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995) (“threat to
Unitrin” and “threat to Unitrin’s uninformed stockholders”); Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368
(Del. 1996) (“corporate threat”); In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp. Shareholder Litig., 669 A.2d 59
(Del. 1995); Moore Corp. Ltd. v. Wallace Computer Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Del.
1995) (applying Delaware law) (“threat to Wallace and its shareholders”); see also Hilton Hotels
Corp. v. ITT Corp., 978 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Nev. 1997) (construing Delaware law for application
to Nevada corporation) (“threat to corporate policy and effectiveness”).
114AMP Inc. v. Allied Signal Inc., 1998 US Dist. LEXIS 15617 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 1998).
115  15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 1712, 1715.
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(such as an auction),111 nor does it impose on directors any duty to insure shareholders get maximum
value.112  The unifying inquiry in virtually all these cases concerns whether there is a threat to the
corporation, not solely or even necessarily to shareholder interests.113
More dramatically, consider the fight for corporate control between Allied-Signal and
AMP.114  In August 1998, Allied-Signal offered a 55% premium over the market price of AMP–in
an all cash/all shares offer–for a company whose profitability had been declining.  It also announced
its intention to wage a consent solicitation to amend AMP’s by-laws, expand the AMP board and
fill the vacancies with its nominees and, later in the battle, to strip AMP’s board of power to amend
AMP’s poison pill and put that power in the hands of a three-person committee.
AMP shareholders overwhelmingly supported Allied-Signal, as of mid-September tendering
72% of AMP’s outstanding into Allied-Signal’s original offer.  Shareholder supporters included the
family of one of the company’s founders (Robert Hixon) and many of the institutional shareholders
that owned about 80% of the stock, including TIAA-CREF.  Indeed, TIAA-CREF was part of a
shareholder group that sued AMP’s board and also took the extraordinary step of separately filing
an amicus brief supporting Allied-Signal in direct litigation between Allied-Signal and AMP.  TIAA-
CREF argued that AMP had trampled on basic “principles of shareholder democracy.”  
AMP’s management had done so–despite this overwhelming shareholder support for Allied-
Signal–by erecting a series of defensive barriers to the bid, taking advantage of Pennsylvania laws
that require directors to act in the best interests not of the shareholders but of the corporation and
further permit boards to act in what they perceive to be the best interests of employees, lenders,
communities and others.115  These barriers included amending its dead hand poison pill provision
from one providing that if a change of control occurred only directors in office prior thereto could
remove the pill to one that simply could not be changed period after a change of control occurs (at
116  Even dead hand pills of the former type (i.e., directors ousted in a proxy vote retain
sole power to amend pill) have been struck down in New York (Irving Bank Corp. v. Bank of
New York (1988) and in Delaware (Carmody v. Toll Brothers, Del. Ch. Oct. 1998) (Jacobs,
V.C.) And the Delaware court is presently considering the validity of a limited-time dead hand
more nearly like that in AMP in the case of Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Systems
Inc. (pending in November 1998).  They were approved in Georgia in Invacare Corp. v.
Healthdyne Technologies Inc. (1997).  For discussion and analysis of these and other pill-related
matters, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Just Say Never?” Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder-
Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 511 (1997).
117  These directors would also have to say they have duties under Delaware law to act in
Allied-Signal and its shareholders best interests and that this might pose a conflict. Allied-Signal
promptly told the judge they could do this within 48 hours and did so.  The court, after taking a
remand of the case back from its appeal on the Third Circuit, accepted these certifications and
allowed the consent solicitation to proceed.  See N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1998.
In a deposition AMP’s Chairman Robert M. Ripp testified that he and his fellow board
members would be obligated to “evaluate any reasonable offer” for the company–including
Allied-Signal’s–though he also believed that AMP was not for sale.  See Chief Says AMP Would
Look at Other Bids, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1998, at C15.  In late November, AMP announced that
it had entered into a white knight business combination with Tyco for a price about 10% higher
than what Allied had offered.  See Wall St. J., Nov. 23, 1998 at A2.
118  AMP, at     .
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least not until the pill’s expiration date)–an extraordinary device.116   AMP sought and won an
injunction prohibiting Allied-Signal’s consent solicitation unless and until each proposed director
candidate affirmed that if elected he or she would be duty-bound under Pennsylvania law to act in
the best interests of the corporation as a whole not just for AMP’s shareholders.117
In upholding the AMP board’s extraordinary actions against Allied-Signal’s claim that it had
breached its fiduciary duties in its response to the Allied-Signal bid, the court repeatedly emphasized
a “stakeholder” standard that appears to be at the heart of Pennsylvania law in the following
unequivocal terms:
“Directors may weigh the interests of the shareholders against the interests of other
constituencies, [and] asserts no specific duty to shareholders above or beyond those owed to
those other constituencies.”118
directors “may, in considering the best interests of the corporation consider the effects on all
groups affected by such action, including shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers, and
creditors of the corporation, and upon communities in which offices or other establishments
119  Id. at    .
120  Id. at    .
121  See generally William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business
Corporation, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 261, 263-65, 272-74 (1992).
122  E.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.59(E) (directors determining what is in the best
interests of the corporation “shall consider the interests of the corporation’s shareholders and, in
his discretion, may consider” the “interests of the corporation’s employees, suppliers, creditors,
and customers” as well as “community” interests); Conn. Stock. Corp. Act  § 33-313(e)
(requiring directors evaluating sale of all or substantially all a corporation’s assets to consider the
interests of such other constituencies); Ind. Bus. Corp. L. § 23-1-35-1(f) (like Pennsylvania,
permitting directors to subordinate shareholder interests to the interests of other constituencies).
123  See Chyrsler Corporation, Proxy Statement 47, 131-32 (Aug. 6, 1998); see also
Singhof & Seiler, supra, at 552.
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of the corporation are located.”119
directors “shall not be required, in considering the best interests of the corporation or the
effects of any action, to regard any corporate interest or the interests of any particular group
affected by such action as a dominant or controlling interest or factor.”120
These are obviously note statements of a shareholder primacy norm.  Less obviously, but
equally true,  the Delaware standards summarized above show far less of a shareholder primacy norm
in the US than the standard rhetoric would suggest.121  Nor are these far-fetched or isolated examples,
for many other US state laws adopt a similar framework.122  Such statements would be right at home
under German law, moreover, perhaps capturing the German sense of the common interest.  
On the German side, consider the Daimler-Chrysler deal. While German law permitted
Daimler’s directors evaluating that merger to consider the interests of workers, lenders and the so-
called common interest, it also required that the board not act counter to the best interests of
shareholders.123  Though giving that special place to shareholders is certainly not a statement of
shareholder primacy, nor is it the standard formulation of the stakeholder model.   In short, US
practice more nearly resembles German practice than it resembles US rhetoric and German practice
more nearly resembles American practice than it does German rhetoric.
D.  Threats in Theory
This same effect of uniting global corporate fiduciary duties in practice can be produced at
the level of theory. Traditional accounts of US corporate law as private law treat corporate law as
consisting of voluntary associations of private actors agreeing to property arrangements that are
124  E.g., Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation, 6 J. Legal Stud. 271 (1977); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The
Corporate Contract, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1416 (1989); William Carney, The American Law
Institute's Corporate Governance Principles: The Death of Property Rights?, 61 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 898 (1993).
125  See Kent Greenfield, From Rights to Regulation, in Patfield, Perspectives on
Company Law (1997); see also Licht, supra; Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation
Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1461 (1989).
126  Greenfield, supra.
127  See Kent Greenfield & John E. Nilsson, Gradgrind’s Education: Using Dickens and
Aristotle to Understand (and Replace?) The Business Judgment Rule, 63 Brooklyn L. Rev. 799,
825-836 (1997).
128  See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 Duke L.J. 425
(1993).
129  See Cunningham & Yablon, supra note.
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contractual rather than political in nature.124  Critics have contended that this rights-based approach
to thinking about corporate law is mere metaphor, rooted not in foundational normative argument
but rather declared as a starting point that treats shareholders as “owners” of corporations and
therefore as possessing private property and contract rights.125
The result of this treatment of shareholders as owners with superior rights to other corporate
constituents may be seen to generate a paradox within US corporate law doctrine when conjoined
with that doctrine’s business judgment rule.   A strict and literal insistence on shareholder wealth
maximization seems incongruous with judicial deference given to managerial decisions under the
business judgment rule.126  Accounts of this seeming paradox have ranged from the dubious claim
that judges are simply not competent to review ordinary business decisions, to the ideological claim
that their own insulation from market forces should keep them out of reviewing business decisions
that are subject to market forces, to the philosophical claim that this reveals some irrationality in the
underlying duty.127
The seeming paradox is not limited to the relationship between the duty of care and the
business judgment rule.  It also may seem to exist in the way US judges at least analyze the duty of
loyalty.  While that duty is stated in the strictest and loftiest terms, it is usually analyzed with a
greater emphasis upon decision making process than resulting substance.128   Similarly, for all the
rhetoric of judicial scrutiny of takeover defense decisions in cases like Unocal and Revlon, ultimately
substantial judicial deference is given director decisions even in those charged contexts.129  Much
the same could be said as a practical matter of both the duty of care and duty of loyalty under
130  See Singhof & Seiler, supra at 553-55; infra Part III.D.
131   See Robert C. Clark, The Genesis and Goals of the ALI’s Corporate Governance
Project, 8 Cardozo L. Rev. 691 (1987).
132  Id. at 715-16.
133  Id.
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German law.  While directors of German corporations do not benefit from any business judgment
rule, shareholders of German corporations lack the sort of litigation enforcement mechanism
available to those of US corporations.130
The duty-deference paradox may be stronger in the case of the duty of care/business
judgment rule than in the duty of loyalty/process focus with the paradox in the takeover defense
context somewhere in between.  Each of these may be stronger again than the German paradox,
which is due to structural limitations rather than doctrinal ones.  The degrees of difference in paradox
strength in turn correlate with the rhetoric used to describe the duty, which enables understanding
the duties and the paradox in a range from a strong form to a weak form. 
The stronger the form of the duty–say the duty of loyalty rather than the duty of care–the
closer it is to vertical governance regulation–a mandate to act for the best interests of the corporation
as a unit.  For example, a loan to a director implicates the duty of loyalty and pits his personal
interests against the corporation’s interest rather than poses a conflict between constituents.  The
weaker the form of the duty, the closer it is to horizontal governance regulation–a mandate to act for
the best interests of a particular group–say, shareholders as opposed to other constituents.  For
example, a gift to a charity in the corporation’s community implicates the duty of care and pits a
community constituent interest against those of shareholders (and other constituents).
The weaker the form of the duty, moreover, the greater judicial deference becomes–greater
deference is given to the charitable donation decision than to the director loan decision.  Yet in all
but the extreme case, the duties in application do not impose on directors a mandate to maximize
shareholder wealth, although the rhetoric often suggests it.  And the rhetoric is strongest in the case
of vertical issues such as director loans and weakest in the case of horizontal issues such as
charitable giving.  It is in between in takeover defense cases, being also in the middle of the range
between vertical and horizontal concerns.
US corporate fiduciary duty law is thus as much about rhetoric as it is about substance.  And
it may sometimes work. Fiduciary rhetoric, even if not applied, "performs a significant socializing
and educational role in corporate governance"131  and the "aspirational aspect of fiduciary duty
influences [director] behavior."132   Corporate law judges embrace the rhetoric and spirit of
traditional fiduciary principles because they understand that they have a "hortatory, tutelary, and
moral function, and are not just drafting loan agreements."133  Yet they also recognize that hardly
134  Meinhard  v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458 (1928).
135  Cf. Note, Craig S. Warkol, Resolving the Paradox Between Legal Theory and Legal
Fact: The Judicial Rejection of the Theory of Efficient Breach, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 321 (1998)
(for all the talk of the theory of efficient breach of contract in law teaching and scholarship,
judges do not apply the theory because it rests upon unrealistic assumptions, is amoral,
misconceives fundamental roles of contract and ignores practical problems of quantification).
136    E.g., QVC, as analyzed in Cunningham & Yablon, supra.
137  E.g., Time-Warner, id.
138  On the debate, compare Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various
Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Fiduciary Duties, 21 Stetson
L. Rev. 23 (1991) with Greenfield, supra.
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anyone can believe that directors can act, in Cardozo’s famous purple prose, with  the "punctilio of
an honor the most sensitive."134   Nor can anyone really believe it is possible for directors solely to
make decisions in ways that maximize shareholder wealth.135
In addition to the proselytizing function of fiduciary rhetoric, it also serves a function of
judicial administration.  When judges recognize objectionable conduct deemed liability worthy, they
have a ready-made and measured stick with which to say so. 136 Yet the rhetoric is sufficiently fluid
that it is also easy to escape from it when the conduct being analyzed does not offend judicial
sensibilities.137
Fiduciary rhetoric thus may be explained as a tool of director proselytization or judicial
administration that serves useful ends even while at the level of particular application it would be
foolhardy to compel compliance with it.  The seeming paradox in the duty-deference framework
dissolves.  So too does the significance of the inconclusive debate over the shareholder primacy
norm versus other corporate constituents.138   At least in the context of theoretical comparative
corporate governance, the legal distance between the market and bank models of corporate
governance shrinks.
E.  Deals
One source of resistance to the harmonization factors discussed previously in this Part is the
role of labor within the US/UK versus the European governance models as a function of the more
profound and foundational law and custom governing employment itself.  Employment-at-will
traditions in the US and UK are fundamentally different from worker-protection traditions in Europe
and Japan.  Yet while such differences are highlighted in abstract accounts of comparative corporate
139  See supra text accompanying notes [Parts I.A & B & C].
140  See Lawrence A. Cunningham & Arthur J. Jacobson, Corbin on Contracts, §4.2 and
sections cross-referenced (1998 Supp.).  Compare Richard A. Posner, Employment at Will, with
Drucilla Cornell, Employment Communities, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. (1987).
141  See supra text accompanying notes [Part I.B].
142  See Gregory L. White, DaimlerChrylser Puts Consumers In Back Seat in New Ad
Campgain, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1988 at B11 (investors and employees are the two most
important audiences for new advertising campaigns launched by Daimler-Chrysler as of the
effective time of the merger, not customers and quoting a company executive as saying that
“We’re going to show [employees] right off the bat they they’re the most important thing that we
have”).
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governance,139 even these deep traditions are changing.  In the US, employment-at-will is certainly
still strong, but as surely it has been moderated by a variety of US worker protection legislation and
judicial decision-making.140 In Japan, lifetime employment remains valued, but less so than it used
to be.141   In both countries and in Europe and the UK, cross-border business combinations reinforce
the underlying demographic forces that are altering these traditions in ways that impact directly on
corporate governance. 
Global mergers like Daimler-Chrysler pose the challenge strikingly.  In the first instance, a
typical merger creates substantial duplication of work force resources across the enterprise.  The
overlap is eliminated to avoid duplication of expenses and entails work force reductions straight
across the entity, from research to marketing to accounting.  In the US, that goes with the territory
whereas in Germany and the rest of Europe it goes against the grain.  Daimler-Chrysler’s
management team had to choose from these models or something in between, and it looks as if it
chose something in between.  At least publicly, it addressed the role of employees in the new entity
mainly by reassuring them that while some synergies would create some redundancies, the entity was
going to grow the business so rapidly that these employees would be retained and deployed in other
ways within the corporation.142  
Subsequent to a merger, the question of employee relations arises as it does in other business
organizations–economic contractions reduce demand for an entity’s products that reduce the demand
for labor.  Standard responses in the US and in Europe differ, with European entities facing more
pressure to retain workers despite their redundancy.  One source of pressure within Germany apart
from legal requirements is the presence on the Supervisory Board of labor representatives positioned
to encourage compliance in letter and spirit with those rules.  In the case of Daimler-Chrysler, the
German company’s Supervisory Board will include of its 10 labor representatives one from the US
United Auto Workers union (UAW).  But as peculiar as that may sound from a US perspective, it
is  not something entirely new to Chrysler–the UAW had a seat on the Chrysler board as part of the
multi-party deal worked out when the US government provided loan guarantees to Chrysler in the
143  In accounting, consider the amalgamations over the past decade that have reduced the
number of major firms from the Big Eight to the Big Five; in finance, consider the merger of
Travelers and Citibank to form Citigroup; in law, consider the merger of Brown & Wood and
White & Case, and the emergence of “global law firms”such as Clifford Chance and Allen &
Overy.
144  See Clifford Chance, Buying a European Business, supra.
145  See Keith Bradsher, Capacity Glut Likely to Spur More Auto Mergers, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 14, 1998, at C-1.   Industry capacity ranges to approximately 70 million vehicles annually
while average annual demand has generally peaked at 50 million and only about 10 of the globe’s
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early 1980s (the UAW representation ended in 1991). 
Cross-border deals like Daimler-Chrysler thus draw on and reinforce convergence trends and
may reshape traditions that do so, even on issues as profound as treatment of workers and allocation
of executive power within the resulting entity.  These reinforcements are driven by business needs
associated with the integration of two separate entities.  They are also reinforced by professionals
advising the merging entities, the repeat and regular participants in the global mergers and
acquisitions market. 
These players include major global banking, law and accounting firms.  On a global scale,
this is a relatively small group that is getting even smaller.143  Members share a common interest in
developing substantially uniform practices and expectations concerning all aspects of a wide range
of cross border deals ranging from private financings to public securities offerings to business
combinations.144 
Indeed the task of the global lawyer has become to pierce conceptual comparative corporate
governance and to confront and use the tools of local law and practice to facilitate transnational
corporate life.  Not only do clients seek and expect that sort of service, achieving it also in the
interest of those professionals apart from client service.  Global lawyers advising boards of directors
about their fiduciary duties in a variety of situations–from the more mundane such as director loans
to the more charged such as takeover defenses–find it far easier to advise corporate boards from a
variety of countries if the variations in those countries are not too large.  The forms of agreement
with which to begin negotiation and structuring of transactions can be more nearly standardized and
the related legal opinions easier to render the more harmonious the governance and finance structures
become. 
Budding professional cultures that are asked and interested in promoting increased harmony
can be expected to deepen in the coming decade as the sorts of bridges that enable transnational deals
to proceed are likely to be replicated elsewhere.  Indeed, within the auto industry in particular,
analysts foresee continued consolidation through cross-border deals once considered too intractable
to achieve.145  The publishing industry is also in the midst of substantial consolidation, increasingly
40 auto manufacturers are profitable.  Id.  Buyer candidates include Ford and Volkswagen (which
acquired UK’s Rolls Royce in early 1998) and target candidates include Nissan (Japan), Volvo
(Sweden), and BMW (Germany).  Id.
146  See Doreen Carvajal, Bertelsmann Signs Deal for Springer-Verlag, N.T. Times, Nov.
21, 1998 at C2. Bertelsmann acquired Random House in early 1998 and entered into an on-line
joint venture with Barnes & Noble later in 1998, and late in the year was involved in discussions
with the French media company Havas S.A.  Id.
147  See Deutches Bank Seen in Deal to Acquire Bankers Trust, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21,
1998 at A-1.
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through global transactions including a number of transactions involving the giant German publisher
Bertelsmann.146  Global alliances are increasingly being seen in many other industries once thought
unlikely candidates for cross-border consolidation, including such banking deals as that between
Deutsche Bank and Bankers Trust,147 and oil deals such that between British Petroleum and Amoco.
As these and other cross-border deals are consummated, differences should continue to evaporate
and a greater and greater degree or uniformity of practices and expectations should emerge.  
F.  Information
One of the most striking and potentially persistent practical differences participants face in
approaching a cross-border deal concerns the nature and amount of available information concerning
a counterparty.  A wealth of information is available concerning a target organized in a market model
country. These countries tend to operate with systems of public recordation of real property as well
as intellectual property.  A well-developed securities and M&A industry augment this information
culture.  Buyers and sellers understand the need for the buyer to obtain information for purposes of
valuation and the need of the seller to obtain contractual protection to preserve its confidentiality.
The custom is to execute a confidentiality agreement early in the exploration process and to provide
the buyer with substantial proprietary data before any sort of other agreement is even discussed.
The culture in bank model countries differs significantly.  Even where mandatory disclosure
rules apply to public companies, access to property records is limited, information is more jealously
guarded, and no or limited securities or M&A industries have fostered an appreciation of the need
for confidential disclosure of information when its recipient is not bound to consummate the deal.
Less well-developed or routinized systems of legal enforcement of such contracts also often leaves
a seller apprehensive about the assurance of confidentiality even if in principle it is willing to
consider it.
Substantively, the sorts of information understood to be relevant as between the models may
also vary.  In the market model, and especially the US, disclosure concerning potential
environmental law and retiree liabilities have been standard for many years.  Environmental
regulation abroad began to develop later and a traditionally greater reliance upon public social
148  See Singhof & Seiler, supra at 531.
149  See Robert Bruce, Tolstoy Would Have Been Proud of IASC, Times (London). May
14, 1998, at 32.  Check out IOSCO’s web site <www.iosco.org>. 
150  The SEC’s own separate work carries with an aspect of harmonization as well.  It has
undertaken a substantial revision of its entire disclosure system, dubbed the Aircraft Carrier
Release due to the enormity of its scope.  See SEC Release, Proposed Rules to Ease Regulations
on the Public Offering Process and Regulations Relating to Takeovers and Shareholder
Communications (Oct. 15, 1998).
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security systems has put private plans off center stage (even in countries, such as Germany, where
such liabilities can not only be substantial but also uncovered by any particular asset base).
Periodic corporate reporting is way more extensive in the US than in Europe (and Japan).
US Federal and state law as well as stock exchange rules and general market pressures and
expectations in the US result in corporations disclosing extraordinary amounts and types of
information to shareholders and to other interested people.  Far more limited and far less effective
disclosure requirements are imposed elsewhere. 
As global corporations as diverse as Daimler-Chrysler and SAP increasingly list shares on
numerous stock exchanges in the US and around the world, they will be subject to US-style
disclosure requirements both as a matter of regulatory mandate and market expectations and demand.
More generally, as the same group of international professionals helps to consummate cross-border
transactions calling for disclosure and evaluation of information, similar pressures are emerging in
a wide variety of settings.  Participants are finding that US-UK style information disclosure is in fact
consistent with existing corporate traditions in most countries, perhaps especially Germany, so that
broadening global corporate laws to require it is also quite possible.148
Just such an effort has been underway by public regulators.  The SEC has been working with
the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IASC) to develop a set of international
standards for non-financial statement disclosure.  These standards are intended to facilitate cross-
border financing and listing by transnational companies while holding them to a single global
standard of disclosure.  Progress has been made, culminating in a planned final but delayed proposal
by IOSCO in 1998.149  Further progress is also expected (and needed), however, as these rules are
limited to offerings and listings of common equity securities only and to transactions for cash and
do not extend to additional disclosure called for in connection with such transactions as tender and
exchange offers, business combinations, or going private or other affiliated transactions.150
_______________
The factors reviewed above suggest some basis for forecasting the hybridization of corporate
governance models in terms of both constituency and finance characteristics, a move that might
make the proper study not so much comparative corporate governance but global corporate
151  OECD, Corporate Governance: Improving Competitivreness and Access to Capital in
Global Markets (preapred by the Business Sector Advisory Group on Corporate Governance). 
Other reports include: Final Report of the Hampel Committee on Corporate Governance (Jan.
1998); Conseil d’Administation des Societes Cotees (the Vienot Report) (1995).
152  See William T. Allen, Ambiguity in Corporation Law, 22 Del. J. Corp. L. 894-897
(1997).
153  See generally, William J. Bratton, The Nexus of Contracts Corporation: A Critical
Appraisal, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 407 (1989).
154 In old fashioned terms, this is an endorsement for revival of the so-called managerialist
school of thought in corporate law championed by Williamson with a modern emphasis on
constituency unity.  See Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies, supra.
155  See supra text accompanying notes [Part II.C].
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governance.  Numerous reports on comparative corporate governance published in the last couple
of years reinforce this view.  In April 1998, for example,  the OECD (Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development) published a report elaborating on principles of corporate governance
suited for an integrated international world market.151  These efforts reflect not only the descriptive
reality and theory discussed in this Part, but also contribute a prescriptive course for global corporate
governance to which the next Part also seeks to contribute.
III. Vertical Corporate Governance
The relative and increasing harmony among the various models and descriptions of corporate
governance around the world is most likely simply an incident to the corporate form of business
organization.  Taken literally or too seriously, neither the abstract standard of shareholder wealth
maximization nor the broad stakeholder model is sustainable.152  Sustained application of the
generalized shareholder primacy norm is unachievable given management control and power and
its relationship with other constituents and a sustained application of the generalized stakeholder
model is unachievable given that shareholders do supply capital that fuels the engine of the
corporation.  The mixed model reality optimizes among competing interests and constraints rather
than maximizes a single objective.153
Accordingly, what should be of greater concern than any competition between shareholders
and workers (or other non-management constituencies) is the competition between these groups on
the one hand and management on the other.154  In the takeover context, for example, whose interests
were really going to be served by AMP’s resistance to Allied-Signal’s bid?155  AMP’s shareholders
did not think their interests were being served and AMP’s own plan to boost the company’s
profitability included cutting the work force by about 9% or 4,200 jobs and closing 10 factories.
AMP’s board may ultimately have served the corporation’s interests in concluding a deal with a
156  See supra note.
157  Apart from the fact that no pure form of any particular model really exists, there is no
reason to believe that any such abstracted model or existing model is optimal.  For example, the
US/UK market model disappoints even from its own point of view measured by industrial
leadership in terms of shareholder wealth creation.  The three strongest corporations in the
automobile industry, for example, are not US companies: BMW, Toyota and Honda dominate the
performance in that sector.  See Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Asset Allocation Review and
Outlook (2Q Review, 3Q Outlook 1998).  That is not to say that Ford and General Motors are not
extremely strong leaders and contenders as well.  It is to say that their governance and finance
models do not necessarily guarantee superior performance as against corporations operating
under different models. Indeed, among the worse performers are Nissan, which has lost money in
6 of the last 7 years and has faced difficulty obtaining additional bank funding in recent years 
See Keith Bradsher, Capacity Glut Likely to Spur More Auto Mergers, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14,
1998.  Japan’s governmental Investment Bank agreed in early November 1998 to provide Nissan
some funding, much as the US government funded Chrysler when it faced financial straits in
1980.  Id.
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friendly partner,156 but their approach was undoubtedly laden with pressure from AMP’s CEO and
management to resist what by all accounts looked good for shareholders in favor of something that
looked bad for workers.
In thinking about the future of such vertical relationships, the key question is which sorts of
practices should emerge.  It would be a mistake to assume that whatever is prevalent in a leading
economic country should be replicated elsewhere.  On the contrary, deficiencies exist within all the
models.157 It is those deficiencies that are important and work must be done to avoid allowing them
to spread like diseases around the corporate world. 
The starting point for all models, as a matter of law certainly and perhaps as a matter of
structural inevitability, is the board of directors overseers.  Attention must be focused on what jobs
boards perform, which are most important, and which current approaches are worst and need
improvement.  It turns out, perhaps unsurprisingly, that the most important jobs are also the ones that
need the most improvement. They are also ones that are pretty much the same across borders and
will increasingly be so as globalization continues.
The most important job any corporate board of directors is entrusted with is selecting an
effective chief executive.  That is true as much in the US as in Germany and other countries.  The
next most important jobs they have are to (a) set the compensation of the CEO and other senior
managerial executives, (b) evaluate and take corporate positions on takeovers, both defensively and
offensively, and (c) to make or review and approve capital allocation decisions.  In each of these
three areas, the major tension is vertical–between managerial interests and those of all other
constituencies collectively.  Effective performance of these jobs depends ultimately not so much on
governance mechanisms as such but on  board integrity.  Vertical governance mechanisms can be
158  Portions of this Section appeared previously in some of the author’s other works:
Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Essays of Warren Buffett: Lessons for Corporate America
(1998), [reprinted from 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 1, 11 (1997)]; Lawrence A. Cunningham, Global
Corporate Governance LXX No. 3 Aspen law & Business (Dec. 1998); and Lawrence A.
Cunningham, The Endless Quest for Integrity in Financial Reporting, 2 PLI’s 30th Annual
Institute on Securities Regulation 11 (1998).
159  See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance 14
(NBER Working Paper 5554, April 1996) (“options are often not so much an incentive device as
a somewhat covert mechanism of self-dealing”); Charles M. Yablon, Overcompensating: The
Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1867 (1992).
160  See Graef Crystal, Maximum Wage, Slate <http://www.slate.com> (July 17, 1997):
[T]he variability of pay from one company to another is amazing.  For
1996, 42 percent of the variation in CEO pay levels could be accounted for by
company size and performance.  Bigger companies pay a lot more than smaller
companies, while better performing companies pay a tiny bit more than worse-
performing companies.  But that leaves 58 percent of the variation in pay
unexplained.  It seems completely random.
Randomness is a just a description of a state of ignorance.  As likely, this variation is probably
attributable to the lack of rigorous linking of pay to performance, in turn a function of inadequate
board attention to this major problem of vertical corporate governance.
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expected to do no more than foster integrity and those both best suited and most at risk of dilution
from current trends are (a) director liability, (b) constituency voice, and (c) market discipline.
A.  Executive Compensation158
 One of the most striking differences between US and German corporate governance is the
levels of executive compensation.  The raw level of compensation is substantially higher in the US
than in Germany, much of it consisting of stock options and awards given to managers.  These so-
called incentive compensation plans purport to align the interests of managers with shareholders.
Some would say their widespread use in the US just reflects the priority given that goal in the US
and their lesser frequency in Germany reflects that goal’s absence or irrelvance.  But the talk of
alignment is a myth that sanitizes management compensation packages that conflict with shareholder
and labor interests.159  
There is no evidence that  the prevailing structure of executive compensation in the US
comes anything close to aligning such interests and much evidence that the structure is simply
random!160 Many corporations pay their managers stock options whose value increases simply by
retention of earnings, rather than by superior deployment of capital to improve performance. But
161  See Subrata Chakrovarty, Three Little Words, Forbes 52-53 (Apr. 13, 1998) (quoting
the author to the foregoing effect).
162  E.g., Annual Survey of CFO Compensation, CFO Magazine (Nov. 1998) (quoting a
highly-paid CFO as being fully in favor of linking pay to performance).
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simply by retaining and reinvesting earnings, managers can report annual earnings increases without
doing anything to improve real returns on capital.  Stock options thus often rob the corporation and
its shareholders of wealth and allocate the booty to the optionees.  Indeed, once granted, stock
options are often irrevocable, unconditional, and benefit the grantees without regard to individual
performance–a form of instant robbery.
Even if stock options instill a culture that encourages optionees to think as if they were
shareholders, optionees are not exposed to the same downside risks as shareholders.  If economic
performance improves and the stock price rises above the exercise price, they will exercise the option
and share with shareholders in that increase.  But if economic performance is unfavorable and the
stock price does not rise above the exercise price, then they will not exercise the options.
Shareholders suffer from the unfavorable performance but the option holder does not.161 
Not only does the putative alignment of option holder and shareholder interests turn out to
be a myth, these awards exacerbate misalignment of interests between option holders of the
corporation–usually senior executives–and other workers.  It increases substantially the ratio of
compensation of high-paid executives to ordinary laborers, which is vastly higher in the US than in
Germany or other European countries.  Reaction to these sorts of problems has consisted mainly of
sustained but mostly unavailing pressure to link stock options and other kinds of performance-based
compensation to real performance of the individual optionee.  At least as a matter of rhetoric, senior
managers have recognized the point.162  But how could they not? Opposing options linked to
performance would be the executive equivalent of congressional opposition to motherhood.
One of the key issues in forging the merger between Chrysler and Daimler-Benz was the
enormous executive compensation differences between those companies and of the ratios within
those companies of compensation between the highest paid and lowest paid employees.  In 1997, for
example, Robert Eaton, Chrysler’s chair, was paid total compensation of about $10 million or over
200 times average worker pay and nearly as much as the total compensation paid to all 10 members
of Daimler-Benz’s Management Board combined.  Daimler’s Chairman, Jurgen Schrempp was paid
about one-tenth of what Eaton was paid, putting his compensation within a ratio of about 20:1
compared to average Daimler workers.
A major question was how the combined entity’s compensation structure would look.
Schrempp pointed out that the existing pay differences reflected cultural differences, particularly the
somewhat more egalitarian corporate culture in Germany expressed through labor representation on
Supervisory Boards.  He also predicted that the way forward for Daimler-Chrysler and other
transnational entities was precisely the US model (surprise), except that “the only way to make big
163  Financial Times
164  Financial Times, Aug. 1998.
165   E.g., Steiner v. Meyerson, 1995 WL 441999 at *5 (Del. Ch. 1995) (allowing that
claims of fraud, self-dealing and sometimes negligence can be sustained against corporate
directors but that claims of non-fraudulent and non-negligent deals between disinterested parties
that meet the legal standard of waste may are “rarest of all” and “possibly non-existence”).
166  E.g., id.  (grant of immediately exercisable stock option not subject to judicial review
under doctrine of corporate waste so long as “there is some rational basis for directors to
conclude that the amount and form of compensation is appropriate”) (emphasis added).
167  See Regulation S-K, Item 402, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (1998).
168  See Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 123 (1998).
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pay packets socially acceptable is by linking them closely with performance.”163
That is of course the rhetoric of corporate America, and given that the other corporate
governance differences noted here are often more nuanced and subtle than generally advertised, one
worries if this was Schrempp’s main point when he said Daimler-Chrysler creates “the first German
company with a North American culture.”164  If so, shareholders and laborers both better watch out,
and also ought to unite for they have coextensive interests in policing this key area of vertical
corporate governance.
German law so far has not been tested for its efficacy in policing excessive executive
compensation due to its relative absence and the rarity of stock options to fuel it.  US law has been
tested and has failed as ill-equipped to police executive compensation. As a matter of corporate law,
the general stance of Delaware and other courts has been to evaluate it, if at all, under a waste
standard, an extremely rare doctrinal basis for upsetting corporate decisions.165 In the case of
executive compensation in particular, the courts have been quite deferential to management
indeed.166
As a matter even of securities disclosure laws, while the SEC has for several years required
substantial and focused disclosure of top executive compensation in comparative performance
charts,167 this form of compensation remains largely off-financial statement.  Indeed, under US
GAAP, except in the historically rare case of so-called variable stock option plans, nothing requires
recording stock option awards as an expense on the income statement or as a liability on the balance
sheet.168
 
SFAS 123 encourages but does not require entities to recognize compensation expense for
169  See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Introductory Accounting and Finance for Lawyers 68-
70 (1997).
170  At least on one particularly pernicious practice concerning the re-pricing of stock
options, however, financial reporting may begin to capture financial reality.  Stock option re-
pricing is a decision made by the issuer’s board to reduce the exercise price of previously-granted
options, usually in the light of a decline in the prevailing trading price of the optioned stock.  It is
in effect a gift to managers from managers that has proliferated substantially in recent years. 
FASB has announced that using this re-pricing technique renders a plan a so-called variable plan
as opposed to a fixed plan and as such is subject to special treatment under APB 25 that requires
recording expense currently (equal to the amount by which the exercise price is reduced). 
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awards of stock, stock options and other equity instruments.  (It only requires such accounting for
such issuance effected to acquire goods or services from non-employees.)  Entities opting out of
recognition must disclose pro forma effects on net income and earnings per share of such issuance
in the footnotes to financial statements. SFAS 123 also requires extensive disclosure from all entities
offering stock-based plans concerning plan terms, exercise prices, and fair value assumptions.
As a practice matter, what this means is that management must measure the fair value of the
awards using the fair value principles of SFAS 123.  They then must decide, for employee
compensation, whether to recognize these amounts as compensation expense on the income
statement pursuant to SFAS 123 or continue to employ APB 25 and make the required footnote
disclosure and pro forma calculations.  The decision will invariably be based upon what ends up
looking more attractive for the bottom line, rather than the degree to which the resulting financial
statements have or lack integrity.  This liberates boards and managers from burdening reported
income with these expenses and gives boards enormous insulation from rebuke for allowing
exorbitant option packages to be given out.
More charitably, SFAS 123's requirement of footnote and pro forma disclosure does provide
users of financial statements with the tools to understand the significance of this form of
compensation.  But this should not be understood as a concession to the standard argument against
recognition: that stock options are hard to value.  They are no harder to value than almost everything
else accounting has to value (think about the numerous judgments necessary to determine appropriate
annual depreciation expense on a fixed asset such as an airplane).169  Indeed with techniques such
as the Black-Scholes option pricing model now widely used and understood it becomes more and
more plausible to believe that valuing stock options is easier than valuing depreciated aircraft.170 
Without the constraints of law or accounting, the job of policing executive compensation lies
with the board.  Its chief job on this subject–in US, German and other corporations–is to insist that
executive compensation be pegged to contributions to corporate performance. Measuring executive
performance by business profitability is the most definitive baseline, for shareholder interests as well
as labor interests.  Profits for measuring performance should be reduced by a charge for the capital
employed in the relevant business or the earnings retained by it.  Stock options should be granted,
171  See supra text accompanying notes [Part II.A].
172  See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336-39 (Del. Ch. 1997) (denying motion to
dismiss shareholder complaint alleging stock options plans amounted to waste); see also
Greenfield, The Place of Workers, supra.
173    Portions of this Section appeared previously in some of the author’s other works:
Cunningham, Buffett Essays, supra; Lawrence A. Cunningham, Warren Buffett on the Role of
the Board, 19 The Corporate Board 6 (July/Aug. 1998).
174  See NY Times, Nov. 27 or 29, 1998.
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if at all, based on how each individual optionee performed within his or her area of responsibility
rather than on overall corporate performance. 
As various groups around the world work to promulgate new international accounting
standards,171 the US position on accounting (or, more precisely, not accounting) for stock options
should be resisted. The rhetoric of alignment of shareholder and manager interests through executive
stock options should also be abandoned.  Attention should be focused on creation of value for the
corporation as a whole, properly measured, with rewards appropriately recorded.  Boards need to
take the leading role in these efforts. It is particularly important for US boards to do so immediately,
to forfend spreading the disease of random executive compensation to other parts of the world as
corporate globalization proceeds.  More selfishly, if they fail to do so, it is also quite possible that
US law will come to enable shareholders as well as workers to turn their social pressure into
effective legal claims.172
B.  Takeovers–Defenses and Offensive Strategies173
Just as the disease of random executive compensation must be contained as globalization
spreads, so too as cross-border acquisitions proliferate must care be taken to minimize their
downside as both a matter of offensive acquisition policies and defensive stances.  Offensive
acquisition strategies require careful board attention because of the strong  possibility that even
outstanding senior managers have interests that can conflict with corporate interests.  Acquisitions
are thrilling, particularly for CEOs.  They give the CEO enormous psychic benefits by expanding his
dominion and generating more action.  When these sorts of impulses drive a CEO toward an
acquisition, the acquisition often comes at corporate expense.  Indeed, most acquisitions both result
in workforce reductions which directly impair worker interests and fail to achieve gains in business
value which directly impairs shareholder interests.174
The governance problem is that most acquisitions do not come to the board for discussion
until the process is substantially underway and until after the CEO has invested substantial personal
capital in it.  To reject an acquisition proposal presented at that stage, a board easily can be seen as
rejecting the CEO who brought it to them.  It embarrasses the CEO at a time when he is very much
175  See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Conversations from the Warren Buffett Symposium,
19 Cardozo L. Rev. 719, 740 (1997) (quoting Warren Buffett as saying that "more dumb
acquisitions are made in the name of strategic plans than any other").
176  See supra text accompanying notes.
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in the spotlight of his troops.  Consequently, all directors–including non-employee directors–are
under significant pressure to approve most acquisitions, even those that harm or do nothing to
improve the lot of shareholders and workers.
It would be nice if a governance mechanism could be designed to alleviate this sort of
pressure on the board, but the timing problem makes that difficult.  It would be a mistake, moreover,
to believe that an appropriate mechanism would be to adopt a strategic plan by which acquisitions
can be measured.175
A better–and more fundamental–strategy is to improve some of the basic thinking that goes
into evaluating acquisitions in the first place.  For example, in paying for acquisitions, a company
should issue stock only when it receives as much in business value as it gives.  Many buyers, when
not using cash or debt, violate this simple rule. Sellers in stock acquisitions measure the purchase
price by the market price of the buyer's stock, not by its intrinsic value.  If a buyer's stock is trading
at a price equal to, say, half its intrinsic value, then a buyer who goes along with that measure gives
twice as much in business value as it is getting.  Its manager, usually rationalizing his or her actions
by arguments about synergies or size, is elevating thrill or excessive optimism above corporate
interests.   In doing so, shareholders and workers interests are subordinated to management interests.
The flip-side of offensive acquisition strategy is takeover defenses.  Anti-takeover devices
such as the US poison pill protect management decision-making (as AMP’s defense against Allied-
Signal attests).176  They can be anti-shareholder to the extent that they have the effect of discouraging
attempts to acquire the corporation or remove incumbent directors even if some or a majority of
stockholders deem such an attempt to be in the corporation’s and their best interest and even if the
potential acquiror is willing to pay a premium over the prevailing market price of the corporation’s
common stock.  They equally can be anti-stakeholder.  Restructurings that entail plant closings, for
example, can impair employee interests and those that entail increased leverage in the capital
structure can also impair lender interests–also as AMP’s resistance to Allied-Signal suggested.
To be sure, there are cases where hostile offers are indeed inadequate and not in the interests
of the corporation or any of its constituents.   Yet incumbent managers facing unwanted takeover
overtures are naturally going to resist, whether or not resisting is best for the corporation.  After all,
in most such cases their jobs are on the line.  For US corporations–and probably increasingly for
others–that also often will mean that unmatured stock options are at risk.  Thus mechanisms that can
aid in resisting inferior bids may equally be used in resisting superior bids and when so used are
simply pro-management and anti-corporation. 
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Boards of corporations around the world must in these situations recognize that the CEO and
his troops are under fire, much as they would be when proposed offensive acquisitions are
challenged.  As in that case, managers can be expected to adopt a siege mentality that obscures
honest thinking about what is in the corporate interest.  Also as in that case, there is no clear
mechanism that can assure boards will respond properly, but recognizing what is happening
psychologically is necessary to enable them to act effectively at all.
C.  Capital Allocation and Dividend Policy
Virtually all jurisdictions put limits on the powers of a corporation to make distributions to
177  Archaic legal capital apparatus are intended to do the work in the UK and in leading
US states of incorporation, including Delaware and New York, although the RMBCA has created
a regime that permits the dismantling of that system.  DGCL §§ 160, 170, 172-74, 242(a)(3);
244; RMBCA  §§ 6.21, 6.22; NYBCL §§ 504, 518.  While some relaxation has occurred as to
what constitutes valid consideration for securities (such as intangible property and services
rendered), many statutes continue to exclude things such as promissory notes and contracts for
future services.  E.g., NYBCL § ; see Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Modern Sensibility of New
York’s New Corporate Law, 69 Aspen Law & Business, Corporation, No. 3, Section 2 (Feb. 2,
1998).   Typical US legal capital regimes such as Delaware permit dividends to be paid out of
surplus, or if there is no surplus, net profits and permits share repurchases so long as effecting
them would not impair the corporation’s capital.  DGCL §§ 160, 170; NYBCL § 510.
German law more nearly resembles the far more enlightened position of the RMBCA,
which  forbids dividends and other distributions unless after effecting them the corporation
would have a positive net worth and be able to pay its debts as they come due in the ordinary
course.   German law also goes a nod further in the shareholder’s direction by permitting
dividends to be paid out of distributable profits as determined by resolution at a shareholder
general meeting for the preceding fiscal year. French law in effect combines these limitations by
permitting payment of dividends only out of retained earnings so long as they do not impair share
capital and only if at the time of and immediately after such distribution, the amount of the
corporation’s net assets is at least equal to the sum of its share capital plus undistributed reserves.
English law is to the same effect, allowing a distribution only if at that time and
immediately afterwards, the amount of the corporation’s net assets is at least equal to share
capital plus undistributed reserves.  English law also provides that dividend declarations must
give reference to accounts showing the availability of distributable reserves, usually its last
audited accounts or  interim unaudited accounts filed with the Registrar of Companies of
England and Wales.   English Articles may permit directors to authorize payment to shareholders
of such interim dividends (i.e. dividends resolved to be paid by directors without the approval of
shareholders in a general meeting), as appear to the directors to be justified by the company’s
distributable profits. 
178  E.g., Klang v. Smith’s Food & Drug Centers, Inc., 702 A.2d 150 (Del. 1997)
(upholding management decision to revalue its balance sheet that made lawful a shareholder
distribution (in the form of a share repurchase) that would have been unlawful under the legal
capital rules without the revaluation).
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its shareholders, but the limits are formal177 and manipulable178 and repose enormous discretion
without meaningful limits in boards to set dividend policy, one of the most important sort of capital
allocation decision there is.
US law gives boards of directors otherwise unbridled discretion in declaration and payment
179  The exceptional case was Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (1919), involving
a closely-held corporation engaged in a larger business and competitive battle.  Most cases even
in those sorts of contexts refuse to upset board dividend policy decisions, e.g., Gottfried v.
Gottfried, 73 N.Y.S.2d 692 (Sup. Ct. 1947), even if they are patently stupid (and involve public
companies), e.g., Kamin v. American Express Co., 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1st Dep’t 1976).
180  See Enno W. Ercklentz, Jr., Modern German Corporation Law 149-51 (1979).
181  See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Lawrence A. Cunningham & Lewis D. Solomon, Corporate
Finance and Governance: Cases and Materials 740-44 (2d ed. 1996)  [hereinafter Mitchell,
Cunningham & Solomon].
182  This is the standard, traditional, teaching of Ben Graham and David Dodd. See Cottle,
Murray & Block, Graham & Dodd’s Security Analysis 555-559 (5th ed. 1998) [hereinafter,
Graham & Dodd].  It is also followed devotedly by Warren Buffett.  See Cunningham, Buffett
Essays, supra.
183  See Graham & Dodd, supra, at 557; Cunningham, Buffett Essays, supra.
184  See Mitchell, Cunningham & Solomon, supra, at 737-38.
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of dividends,179 which is rarely restricted in charters though it is sometimes restricted pursuant to a
corporation’s loan and credit agreements.  Those restrictions are as often imposed on German
corporations, whose Management Board otherwise also possesses pretty much full discretion in
setting dividend policy as well.180
The policy of most US boards is to pay regular quarterly cash dividends, often at a stable or
steadily increasing dollar amount, and the typical levels of dividends among US corporations is
higher than among German and other European corporations. Given the importance of dividend
policy in capital allocation decisions, these policies are often set for strange reasons such as giving
the appearance of steadiness and reliability, signaling confidence and so on.181
A more rigorous approach should be used and if it were, the resulting payout ratios would
probably converge, becoming lower in the US-UK and higher in Europe.  The proper approach to
a company's earnings payout versus retention decision should be based on a single test: each dollar
of earnings should be retained if retention will increase market value by at least a like amount;
otherwise it should be paid out.182  Earnings retention is justified and should be done when, but only
when, capital retained produces incremental earnings at least equal to what is generally available to
the shareholders.183  For companies that are able to do so, no dividends should be paid and boards
should pay no attention to what “signals” this sends (though they might also pay attention to the tax
advantages to shareholders of doing so).184
On the related question of distributions via share repurchases, one would also expect the
185  German law allows a corporation to acquire its own shares upon the authorization by
shareholders in only limited circumstances and in any event not more than 10% of the
outstanding shares.   See    .  French law generally prohibits corporate share repurchases, except
in limited circumstances such as to effect reductions in capital not motivated by losses and
purchases of shares for the account of employees or to stabilize the trading price of the
company's stock on a stock exchange.  See    .
186  See 3 Insights from the Investment World (Oct.-Dec. 1998) at 12 (private investment
newsletter written and published by Dr. John M. Theolotitis) (on file with the author)
[hereinafter, Insights]. 
187   See Insights, supra.  Moreover:
share repurchases are preferable because large dividend payments leave shareholders with
unwanted tax bills and the question of the reinvestment of proceeds, and in the case of
compounding businesses, extra money from the powerful compounding effect.  The
cautious application of a well designed dividend policy has long ago been established as a
key factor that determines the company’s good reputation–despite its questionable
value–and as such is followed by almost all companies.  In the case of compounding
businesses where the compounding rate exceeds the free reinvestment rate of dividend
amounts, after also taking into account the effects of taxation, shareholders will
undoubtedly be far better off with the minimum or no dividend at all and the reinvestment
of net earnings in share buybacks.
Id.
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optimal level to be somewhere between the norms prevalent in the US/UK and Europe.   Share
repurchases are far less common in Europe than in the US, but they are also too infrequent in the US.
European law often either prohibits share repurchases or discourages them.185  One reason behind
this European aversion is a governmental attitude preferring reinvestment of available cash on the
theory that that is a better way to create jobs.186  This is of course only seduction, a view that focuses
on the superficial and the political rather than the substantive and economic. 
Dividends and repurchases recycle investment rather than dissipate it.187  To the extent the
level of share repurchases in the US is lower than optimal is probably due to a different reason:
managerial cash hoarding for acquisition feasts of the type described a few pages ago.  The dangers
to American violators of the retained earnings test are the same dangers that afflict excessive
retention in European corporations–the venturing into unprofitable projects that serve only
managerial and not shareholder or worker interests.
D.  Director Liability
Directors’ feet must be held to the fire for all corporate constituencies in connection with
188  Apart from those to which all persons are subject, such as liability for crimes and
fraud, including fraud under such sections of the the federal securities disclosure rules as Rule
10b-5 and Rule 14a-9.
189  See supra text accompanying notes [Part II.D].
190  See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996);
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. Ch. 1963).
191  See supra text accompanying notes [Part III.A & C].
192  488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
193  E.g., DGCL § 102(b)(7); RMBCA § 2..02(b)(4).
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CEO selection, executive compensation, takeovers, and capital allocation.  Yet neither in the US/UK
nor in Europe does that occur for these types of actions.  In the US, this is due in part to the business
judgment rule and the rhetorical nature of fiduciary duty law, not to any lack of procedural
enforcement devices through litigation.  It is also due to liberal policies of director liability
indemnification and immunization.  In Europe, it is due not to any business judgment rule or
rhetorical fiduciary tradition nor to director liability limitations but rather to a lack of enforcement
mechanisms or incentives.  In both models, therefore, directors are insulated (though from different
sources) and on this comparative score of vertical corporate governance improvements in both
models are coming due.
What risks of liability are US directors really exposed to?  Almost none.188  Most board
decisions are strongly insulated from judicial review under the business judgment rule.  Those
involving conflicts or potential self-dealing are provided substantial protection via interested director
statutes that sanitize such transactions and even when evaluated judicially the focus is on the process
of decision-making rather than the substance.189  Those involving corporate monitoring programs
remain subject to evaluation under the duty of care and it is not very difficult to meet the required
standard.190  As already lamentably noted, it takes very little to discharge duties in connection with
decisions concerning such key issues as executive compensation and dividend policy.191
While some boards have occasionally been held liable in connection with takeover defenses,
that is rare, and in the case of offensive strategies basically unheard of.  One of those rare cases was
Smith v. Van Gorkum,192 the case that spawned adoption of further insulation from director liability.
In that case, the source of liability was the failure of directors to become adequately informed before
taking a decision of enormous consequence to the corporation–the sale of the corporation!  The
legislative response to judicial imposition of director liability was a statutory invitation to director
liability insulation via simple charter amendment193 or, in some states, a statutory declaration of
194  E.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 23-1-35(1)(e)(2) (immunizing directors from personal liability
for breaches of the duty of care other than for willful misconduct or recklessness); see also Va.
Code Ann. § 13.1-692.1 (while not changing the standard of conduct, imposing dollar limits on
extent of director personal liability).
195   They also generally allow the corporation to advance expenses needed by an officer
or director to defend an action as long as they agree to repay the amount if later found not to be
entitled to indemnification, as well as to provide directors and officers with insurance.   See E.
Norman Veasey et al, Delaware Supports Directors with a Three-Legged Stool of Limited
Liability, Indemnification and Insurance, 42 Bus. Law. 401 (1987).    Often corporations will not
indemnify for expenses when a director or officer is adjudged liable to the corporation in a
derivative action, but do indemnify officers and directors when they are successful in defending a
third party or derivative action  The DGCL provides that the indemnification provided for in the
DGCL shall not be deemed exclusive of any other rights under any bylaw, agreement, vote of
stockholders or disinterested directors, or otherwise, and provides that expenses may be
advanced to officers and directors in a specific case upon receipt of an undertaking to repay if the
indemnified party is ultimately determined not to be entitled to it.   See Advanced Mining
Systems, Inc. v. Fricke, 623 A.2d 82 (Del. Ch. 1992) (noting that advancement of legal expenses
and ultimate entitlement to indemnification are two distinct questions).  In addition, the DGCL
permits the determination as to whether an officer or director has met the applicable standard of
conduct to be made in certain circumstances by independent legal counsel.
196  See Reinier Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Cost of Legal Controls,
93 Yale L. J. 857 (1984).
197  See Joseph W. Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the
Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 Yale L. J. 1078 (1968).
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insulation without any need for a charter amendment.194  Moreover, most US state laws also permit
corporations to provide for  indemnification of officers and directors defending third party actions
arising from their service so long as the person acted in good faith and reasonably.195 
These devices have functionally sealed off any real exposure to liability for directors of US
corporations (other than red-handed thieves and defrauders).  That has the virtue of helping to attract
top directors to positions.  It has the vice of helping to attract horrible or (and this is worse because
it is less obvious) mediocre directors to the same jobs.  They may be efficient to the extent that
shareholders are better bearers of risk than managers and the insulation enables directors to optimize
their risk taking and undertake projects that more risk-averse liability-exposed directors would
shun.196  On the other hand, the insulation can go too far in relieving directors of risk and shifting
it to shareholders and other corporate constituents.197 
Of course directors should not be entirely exposed to liability for all their decisions and it
should not be possible to extract rents from them through extortionate lawsuits.  The key point is that
198 See James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer
Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 Bus. Law. 1207 (1988).
199  See ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance § 7.19 (1994).  At the other extreme,
those who see no substantive value in the duty of care itself would be happy to abolish it,
including through exculpation and indemnification mechanisms.  E.g., Kenneth E. Scott,
Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 Stan. L.
Rev. 927, 935-37 (1983).
200  See supra text accompanying notes [Part II.D].
201  It does permit corporations to indemnify a director for attorneys fees if successful in
defending actions brought in jurisdictions in which winning parties bear their own litigation costs
and, with shareholder approval, to waive or settle claims against directors over three years old.  It
also permits a corporation to indemnify its officers and in certain circumstances it must do so and
permits corporations to buy insurance for directors and officers. 
202  See
203  See supra text accompanying notes [Part I.B].
-51-
a balance between director protection and exposure must be struck.  While it is hard to strike,
abstractly or in particular,198  the current balance is far out of whack.  Doctrinally, the US middle
ground has been staked out by the American Law Institute, which recommends mechanisms that
neutralize disproportionate liability by director protection that does not abrogate the duty of care.199
That balanced stance leaves at least some meaning to potential power of fiduciary duty rhetoric.200
Under that framework, it should be possible to require directors to be fully informed about,
say, executive compensation packages and dividend policies, and know that if they approve pay
packages unlinked to performance without knowing they were doing so or dividend policies that
hoard cash at poor rates of return which are later spent on profitless acquisitions, that they might be
responsible for those actions in the form of personal liability.  Would exposing directors to personal
liability for this sort of ineptitude reduce the number of directors willing to serve by deterring some
from service?  Probably, but the deterred would equally probably be those who would not give the
attention those sorts of important questions deserve in any event and they should not be on boards
in the first place.
Europe has not had such conceivable recruiting trouble, despite absence of rules of director
immunization.  German law does not permit director exculpation and extremely limits
indemnification201 and  French law permits neither.202  The formal exposure to liability these laws
sustain for European directors may not at present be especially meaningful since where large bank
debtholders and shareholders are also those serving on the boards, lawsuits by holders against boards
are not very likely.203  But consider English law, which also does not permit immunization and also
204  English companies may not indemnify directors or officers against liability for
negligence, default, or breach of duty or trust, except liability incurred defending cases he wins
(or if a court determines that even though he lost he had acted honestly and reasonably and
should fairly be excused).  They are permitted to buy insurance for directors and officers against
such liability.
205  Ordinarily, the shareholder must have been a shareholder at the time of the transaction
which is the subject of the suit and through the duration of a derivative suit.  Prior to bringing a
derivative suit, the shareholder usually must make a demand on the directors of the corporation
to assert the corporate claim unless such a demand would be futile.  
206    However, shareholders of German corporations acting at a meeting by a majority of
votes cast or shareholders holding 10% of the outstanding shares may request the corporation to
claim damages against directors of either board for breaches of their duties.
207  In contrast, French law permits these suits, even as it limits director liability
exculpation.
208  See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J.
Fin. 737 (1997).
209  See Philip E. Strahan, Securities Class Actions, Corporate Governance and managerial
Agency Problems (Nov. 1998) (manuscript on file with the author).
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severely limits indemnification to narrow circumstances.204   These have not deterred attracting top
directors to shareholder market model corporations in the UK.  And even if these European laws that
expose directors to personal liability without indemnification now may not mean very much, as the
forces of globalization continue the exposure is unlikely to remain unimportant.  Retaining those
laws will be important, however, and it can be expected that efforts to change them will be made and
should be resisted.
Another possible reason for these national differences in director liability exposure (between
the US and Germany at least) is the availability of enforcement mechanisms, principally litigation.
 US state laws permit shareholders to bring derivative actions on behalf of the corporation as well
as class actions.205  All the more reason to restrict director liability.  German corporate law (and
English law) provides for neither class actions nor generally permits shareholders to bring derivative
suits.206   All the less need to do so.207  Again, as the landscape continues to change, however,
attention should be paid to the interaction between these stances and their role in corporate
governance.
The ability to maintain lawsuits is an important aspect of US corporate governance.  It
contributes to the depth and liquidity of capital markets by encouraging investment208 and can help
to discipline managers.209  It is made possible in part due to a general cultural orientation toward
210  See Procaccia, supra note, at 641-43.
211  Id. 
212  Instead, workers of US corporations have claims, if any, against the corporation as a
juridical entity, yet they also have a bewildering array of grounds available to them to protect
their interests.  Workers and lenders of course may have contract rights, in the form of
employment or collective bargaining agreements on the one hand or loan agreements on the
other.  The sources of these rights, unlike in Europe, derive not so much from the internal
governance mechanisms of corporate law but from other bodies of law.
213  See Greenfield, The Place of Workers, supra note [Part I.A]..
214  See supra text accompanying notes [Part II.A].
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judicial dispute resolution, but also through incentive structures not accepted elsewhere.  In
particular, it neutralizes an otherwise skewed  incentive structure of derivative claims: the nominal
plaintiff incurs substantial costs but reaps the gains only in proportion to its contribution to the
corporate entity’s equity (the payoff goes to the corporation).  Some cultures may find it unattractive
to so cede “ownership” of the claim from the shareholder to the lawyer210 or may not see the
shareholder as the proper “owner” of the claim in the first place.
Another way to address the skewed incentive structure would realign the incentives on the
cost side by authorizing a country’s public securities authority (analogous to the SEC) to fund
lawsuits and on the benefit side by authorizing judges to award lead plaintiffs compensation for their
efforts.211  Another way to address the question of the proper claimant would be to allow not only
shareholders but also other constituencies to sue.  While this is pretty much off limits in US
corporations,212 it is not inconceivable213 and would be in tune at least with historical traditions in
Europe.  On the other hand, in line with the trends in Europe that retreat from those traditions,
precisely that sort of proposal died on the vine there.214  The outlook for resolving these questions
is therefore very murky indeed, though that tends to underscore rather than undermine the need for
increased attention to the importance of vertical corporate governance worldwide.
E.  Constituency Voice
Getting boards to listen to constituents would be an effective method of corporate governance
but again legal and practical limits have frustrated this simple vehicle across the globe.  Constituency
voice is limited in part by rational apathy and collective action problems, but this is only part of the
trouble.
Most US state laws authorize corporations to establish procedures governing the making of
215  See Auer v. Dressel, 306 N.Y. 427 (1954); Campbell v. Loew’s, Inc., 134 A.2d 852
(Del. 1957).
216  See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §14(a) and Securities and Exchange
Commission Rule 14(a)(8).
217  See No-Action letters file in the SEC web-site or LEXIS data base.
218  Rule 14a-8(a)(1).
219  See Record Number of Resolutions Win Majority Votes, 8 IRRC Corporate
Governance Highlights 129 (Oct. 24, 1997) [hereinafter, Record Number].
220  See Henry G. Manne, Shareholder Social Proposals Viewed by an Opponent, 24 Stan.
L. Rev. 481 (1972).
221  Cracker Barrel Old Country Stores, Inc., No-Action Letter, 1992 WL 289095, 1992
SEC No-Act. LEXIS 984, *43 (Oct. 13, 1992).
222  Rule 14a-8(c)(7). 
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shareholder proposals at annual or special meetings215 and SEC rules impose additional rules on what
proposals management must include in its proxy statements and which it may exclude.216 As a matter
of practice, management would on average strongly prefer rules that enable them to omit shareholder
proposals from their proxy statements and every year hundreds of them try to do so.217
In many of those proposals, constituency interests do conflict.  This is principally because
in the US virtually anyone can satisfy the eligibility requirements for compelling a corporation to
include a so-called “shareholder” proposal on the corporation’s annual proxy statement.  Under US
Federal proxy rules it is enough to be eligible to own 1% or $1,000 in market value of the
corporation’s equity for one year.218  “Shareholder” proposals thus often turn out to be made by
nominal shareholders,219 proposing such things as reporting requirements concerning environmental
impacts of corporate actions or relating to race and sex discrimination or human rights activities
around the world.220  
One of the most dramatic recent examples of the controversial contours of these rules was
championed by employees advocating greater toleration for gay and lesbian workers of Cracker
Barrel Stores.221  The SEC vacillated on whether management could exclude that proposal on the
grounds that it interfered with the “ordinary business operations” grounds for exclusion under the
shareholder proposal rule.222 It ultimately yielded and, in promulgating new rules governing these
proposals reversed its position to prohibit management to refuse to include such proposals to the
223  The SEC initially determined that “distinctions between policies implicating broad
social issues and the conduct of day-to-day business simply too hard to draw as regards the
employment of the general workforce.”  See Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).  The Wal-Mart court rebuked the
SEC’s position on the grounds that it “sharply deviate[d]” from other positions it had taken,
leading the court to refuse to defer to the SEC’s positions.  Id.  As part of a general review and
improvement of the shareholder proposal rule adopted in 1998, the SEC indicated that it had
reversed its position in the original Cracker Barrel no-action letter.   See SEC Release
Concerning Rule 14a-8 (May 21, 1998) (new rules effective June 29, 1998).
224  See supra text accompanying notes [parts of Parts I.A-D].
225  For example, half of Daimler-Chrysler shareholders are US residents and a quarter of
SAP’s are. [Update for Deutsch Bank and Bankers Trust, etc.]
226  See Lewis D. Solomon et al., Corporations Law and Policy 597 (4th ed. 1998).
227  See Donald E. Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign
GM, 69 Mich. L. Rev. 419 (1971).
228  See Record Number, supra.
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extent they implicate questions of social policy.223
German law is somewhat tougher.  It empowers shareholders to put a matter on the agenda
for resolution and have the Management Board submit a proposal at shareholder meetings but only
if they hold in the aggregate at least 5% of the outstanding shares.  The 5% requirement makes it
pretty much prohibitive for non-shareholder interests to use this vehicle of voice as it has been used
in the US.  It is possible to understand this difference between German and US law also in terms of
historical governance structures that gave formal representation to workers on boards and a corporate
conception of the common interest or common good.  Yet again, as these devices prove to be more
formal than real224 and as German corporations increasingly have shareholders from the US and other
foreign countries,225 the need for other avenues of constituency voice is likely to increase.
The US mechanisms for shareholder or other constituency voice can have meaningful
constraining effects on managerial discretion.  They have led to substantial changes in policies at
many major corporations, for both shareholders and others.   Beginning in the 1930s, the shareholder
proposal rule was used to enhance shareholder rights with proposals seeking such things as
cumulative voting and dissemination of post-meeting reports to shareholders.226  The power of this
device was harnessed by other constituencies to effect social change beginning in the 1970s with the
famous Campaign GM that led to integration of GM’s board of directors.227   In the past couple of
decades shareholders and other constituencies alike have used the device thousands of times and
although most such campaigns do not carry a majority vote, increasing numbers are winning.228
229  Id.
230  Federal courts evaluating the legitimacy of a corporation’s claimed ground of
exclusion look to state law to make that determination.  E.g., International Brotherhood of
Teamsters General Fund v. Fleming Cos., Inc., 1997 US Dist. LEXIS 2980 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 24,
1997), appeal pending on certified question to the Oklahoma Supreme Court.  Trouble is, since
the enactment of the Federal proxy rules the SEC has led the way in making determinations about
application of the shareholder proposal, leaving state law on the subject pretty much
undeveloped.  See Wal-Mart, 821 F. Supp. at n.7.
231  Cf. James P. Holdcroft, Jr. & Jonathan R. Macey, Flexibility in Determining the Role
of the Board of Directors in the Age of Information, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 291 (1997).
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The problem is that management often opts not to implement even a winning proposal
anyway.229  And that is no surprise.  After all, if management believed in the proposal they would
have adopted it without need for a constituency proposal or vote. It may be that the only available
tools to police director conduct in such settings–fiduciary duties–are simply inadequate for such a
job.  In addition, in the US there is a problem of stakeholder versus shareholder interest. Since
everyone knows proposals can be made by nominal shareholders, even a proposal that wins the
support of a majority of shareholders can be taken lightly.
Yet it is incongruous to allow constituencies (nominally shareholders) to exercise this right
of voice and then allow management to ignore it. This may simply mean that the SEC rules are
inappropriate or tend too much to alter conceptual underpinnings of state corporate law allocations
of power between boards and managers on the one hand and shareholders and other constituencies
on the other.  But the overall framework of the shareholder proposal rule is dedicated to respecting
such state laws and indeed is ultimately designed as a mechanism through which the proxy voting
apparatus can serve as a surrogate for the old-fashioned live shareholder meeting.230
Indeed, the combination of easy access for all constituents of the proposal mechanism, and
the requirement of a shareholder vote, should have the opposite effect on management in a corporate
governance system that does extend its protections to a range of constituents.  Boards should take
these exercises of constituency democracy seriously.  To do so, the traditional formulation and
application of fiduciary duties would have to be modified on directive lines.  In particular, boards
could be called upon to review the proposal, to become fully informed with respect to it, and to adopt
it following majority vote unless they can furnish compelling reasons not to.  In short, if constituents
vote favorably upon a proposal properly submitted, management should be obligated to act.231
F.  Markets
Director liability and constituency voice can promote effective board superintendence of
managerial power, yet neither these nor any other will impose sufficient discipline either at all
corporations or in all contexts.  Fortifying these mechanisms must be markets, particularly capital
232  See Cunningham, Conversations from the Buffett Symposium, supra note     , at 727-
28.
233  See supra text accompanying notes [Part II.A].
234  See Fabrizio Barca, Some Views on U.S. Corporate Governance, 1998 Colum. Bus. L.
rev. 1 & Gerard Hertig, Corporate Governance in the United States as Seen From Europe, 1998
Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 27.
235  See supra text accompanying notes [Part III.D].
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markets and executive labor markets.  Governance mechanisms–here including external governance
mechanisms–must be evaluated in part in terms of their impact on the operation of these markets.
In terms of reputational interest as a supplier of services in a market, individual managers or
directors can be disciplined through public scrutiny and reporting of their performance.232  Bad press
leads to bad reputations and bad job prospects.  That series of threats can hold directors’ (and other
managers’ and people generally) to the fire.  Yet a whole series of mechanisms exist that tend to
interfere with the activation of these threats, including particularly a few mentioned earlier. 
Excessive executive compensation neutralizes the threat by weakening the executive’s
dependency on labor income.  Limits on director liability for inattention or foolishness also insulate
the offending director from the kind of scrutiny that those actions would generate if a court were to
announce that they were objectionable.  The mechanisms of vertical corporate governance should
not inhibit the mechanisms of external corporate governance in these ways, but unless revised along
the lines suggested above they will continue to do so.
As for capital markets, they can impose discipline both in terms of a corporation’s ability to
attract capital and on its ability to evade becoming a takeover target.  To be effective, depth and
efficiency are required–a possible condition in the US/UK and an increasingly possible condition
in Europe.233  As with impairment of executive labor markets, the devices of vertical governance that
capital markets facilitate are often impaired by external governance constraints, especially takeover
regulation. 
While continental European law is often seen as entailing substantial governmental regulation
and intervention (and is called corporatist) and US/UK law as free market (and is called capitalist)
this is no more a complete picture than the abstract comparative pictures drawn of governance
models in Part I.  The US and UK impose substantial external governance regulations on these
markets compared to Europe,234 retarding efficiency in ways that render those markets’ effectiveness
more like their effectiveness in Europe (in much the same way directors are insulated from liability
in both models from different sources).235
In the UK, takeovers of PLCs are regulated by the City Code on Takeovers, which contains
236  See
237  See
238  See Dale Arthur Oesterle, Revisiting the Anti-Takeover Fervor of the ‘80s Through
the Letters of Warren Buffett: Current Acquisition Practice Is Clogged by Legal Flotsam from the
Decade, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 565 (1997).
239  These statutes typically define business combinations to include certain mergers, sales
of assets, sales of five percent or more of outstanding stock, loans, recapitalizations, liquidations
and dissolutions.
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a number of restrictions on action by target company boards that would frustrate a takeover offers,
including issuance of new shares without prior shareholder approval.236  The English Companies Act
also contains rules relating to takeover offers, including a requirement that if an acquirer obtains or
agrees to obtain 90% or more in value of shares, it may within two months after reaching the 90%
level, by notice, acquire the remaining shares on the same terms as the offer.237  Holders of those
remaining shares can apply to a court to be relieved of the obligation to sell to the acquirer or to have
the court specify different terms of transfer.  Alternatively, those remaining shareholders not given
such notice may compel the acquirer to buy their shares.
 The US Exchange Act contains extensive provisions regulating tender offers, mainly
imposing requirements on the form of an offer and also requiring comprehensive and detailed
disclosure upon commencement of a tender offer.  Requirements include a 20 business day minimum
offering period, shareholder withdrawal rights coextensive with the offering period, withdrawal
rights after 60 days from the date of the initial offer if the offeror has failed to pay, pro rata
acceptance for oversubscribed offers, nondiscrimination among offerees, and the extension of any
price increase during the tender offer to all shareholders who had previously tendered.   These all
have the effect of tilting the level of play in favor of targets and against insurgents.238   
Worse, state laws also impose extensive regulation of takeovers in the US that often makes
hostile takeovers far more difficult and costly to effect. Typical examples prohibit business
combinations239 between a corporation and a 10% or greater shareholder (called an interested holder)
unless either  the share acquisition or business combination was approved by the board of directors
of the corporation before the shareholder became an interested shareholder or a period of years–often
five–have elapsed and the deal is either approved by a majority of the non-interested shareholders
or those shareholders are paid  fair value for their stock.  Other statutes provide that upon an acquirer
obtaining 20% or more of the target's voting stock it must file a disclosure statement, following
which target management may call and hold a special shareholders meeting (within say 50 days) at
which disinterested shareholders vote to determine whether the acquirer’s shares should have voting
rights–absent that approval, those shares lack voting rights.  Moreover, failure to file the required
disclosure statement empowers the target to redeem the acquiror's shares at a price determined by
240   A main consequence of many takeovers effected by management against shareholder
interests is the cashing out of shareholders at prices the shareholders deem inadequate.  When the
front-end devices of internal corporate governance fail in that respect, shareholders can be
protected by appraisal rights as back-end discipline.  Under US state laws, a stockholder of a
corporation participating in certain major corporate transactions may, under varying
circumstances, be entitled to receive cash equal to the fair market value of the shares held by
such stockholder (as determined by a court of competent jurisdiction or by agreement of the
stockholder and the corporation), in lieu of the consideration it would otherwise receive in the
transaction.  Some states–notably Delaware and New York, though not the RMBCA states—also
provide a “stock-market” exception to these rights with respect to (a) a sale of assets, (b) a
merger by a corporation, if the shares of the corporation are either listed on a national securities
exchange or designated as a national market security on an interdealer quotation system by the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. or held by more than 2,000 shareholders of
record or if stockholders receive shares of the surviving corporation or of a listed or widely-held
corporation, or (c) a merger in which the corporation is the surviving corporation if no vote of its
stockholders is required to approve the merger.  This is a pro-management exception unknown to
German law, where shareholders are entitled to a valuation proceeding to determine the adequacy
of consideration to be paid in connection with transactions including mergers and freeze-outs,
subject to statutory procedural requirements.  Some may see these differences as properly
reflecting different degrees of efficiency in the respective capital markets of the US and
Germany.  While there are certainly differences, there is also reason to doubt that US capital
markets are so efficient to justify this exception to the appraisal remedy.
241  See Thomas C. Frame, Equities: US Equities, in Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Asset
Allocation Review and Outlook (3Q 1998 & 4Q 1998) (on file with the author); see also
Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of
the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 546 (1994).
242  See supra text accompanying notes [Part II.A].
243  See supra text accompanying notes [Part II.A].  It is possible that these anti-takeover
mechanisms are unnecessary in Germany since worker representation on the supervisory board
would resist allowing shareholders to wrest control if they intended to disrupt employment as a
result.  See Roe, Some Differences, supra note   at 1970.  Yet not all takeovers have such an
effect on workers so co-determination is not a complete anti-takeover device.  Managers facing
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the target.240
These devices impair the efficacy of capital market discipline, which is already limited by
its own internal inefficiencies evidenced by gigantic stock gyrations as the norm with an average
company’s high and low over a 52-week period extending in a range of 50%.241   These regulations
have been virtually nonexistent in continental Europe, but with the new European exchange
structure242 you can be sure there will be pressure in that direction.243  Granted, these devices–like
enhanced capital market scrutiny may begin to look for other devices.
244    See supra text accompanying notes [Part I.C].
245    See supra text accompanying notes [Part I.C].
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poison pills and other private company takeover defenses–are sometimes useful in enabling boards
to deflect offers that would dis-serve corporate interests.244  Finding the ideal balance is an awesome
challenge, as the experience in the US shows.  It will be no less challenging for Europe and the rest
of the future corporate world as it moves, seemingly inexorably, toward convergence, compromise,
and middle grounds in trade-off dilemmas.245
Conclusion
The proliferation of cross border deals is hastening the fusion of corporate governance
principles around the world.  Despite substantial cultural, legal and business differences that do exist
and persist across national boundaries, the differences are not so pronounced as to prevent business
combinations of companies organized in different countries and those business combinations both
draw upon points of governance harmony and help to forge deeper fusion. Cross-border alliances
among businesses and active engagement with their implications by numerous global organizations
are leading to the articulation of  a new global corporate governance template that uses existing tools
to build a new corporate world order.  The ultimate shape of that order should be guided by
recognition of the extensive degree of commonality of challenges and forged to meet those
challenges in a realistic way.  In particular, the core problems world-wide corporations face are not
all that different, particularly in terms of the vertical relationship between those in control of
corporations and others.  In those terms, the central jobs corporate boards face are at bottom pretty
much identical.  The sorts of basic vertical governance mechanisms that offer promise of helping
directors do these jobs are also pretty much the same and the cultural barriers to enabling them are
far lower than in cases of external or horizontal governance settings.
